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Foreword
n retrospect, it appears that the Soviet launch of Sputniks 1 and 2 ill the autumn of 1957 took place
at exactly the right time to inspire the U.S. entrance into the space age. Tile ingredients were in place
to begin space exploration already, but the Sputnik crisis prompted important legislation that brought
many of these elements together into a single organization. By striking a blow at U.S. prestige, the
Sputnik crisis had the effect of unifying gro,_,ps that had been working separately on space missions.
national defense, arms control, and within national and international organizations. The National
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 was a tangible resuh of that national unitication and accomplished
one fundamental objective: it ensured that outer space would be a dependable, o,'derly place for benefi-
cial pursuits.
There have been many detailed historical studies of the process of crafting and passing the the leg-
islation that created the National Aeronautics and Space Administ,'ation (NASA). Signed into law by
president Dwight D. Eisenhower on July 29. 1958, the "Space Act," as it came to be called, set forth a
broad mission for NASA to "plan. direct, and conduct aeronautical and space activities"; to involve the
nation's scientific community in these activities: and to disseminate widely information about these activ-
ities. The Act remains the core statement governing United States civil space exploration activities.
launching as it did an organization that preempted outer space for peaceful exploration and uses that
Americans have now enjoyed fl_r fort)' years.
At the time of the fortieth anniversary of NASA. it seems appropriate to revisit the origins of the
Space Act. Consequently, the NASA Histor7 Office chose to publish a monograph containing the recol-
lections of key participants in the legislative process. The collective oral history presented here origi-
nated ira 1992 and included the following participants:
• Paul G. Dembling was the general counsel of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
(NACA) during the critical 1957-1958 period and played a principal role ira drafting the bill which
uhimately became the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. He later served as the NASA
general counsel.
• Eilene Galloway served as Senio, Specialist in International Relations (National Security) for the
Congressional Research Service. Following the launching of Sputnik 1. she was Special Consultant
to Senator Lyndon B. Johnson and to Representative John W. McCo,mack during congressional hear-
ings on the "'Space Act."
• George E. Reedy was the senior advisor to Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, Senate Majority Leader, in
1957 and 1958 during the Sputnik crisis and the consideration of legislation that eventually became
the "Space Act."
• Gerahl W. Siegel serwed during the 1950s ira various staff positions with the Senate. including those
of counsel to the Democratic Policy Committee and the preparedness investigating subcommittee of
the Senate Armed Services Committee. He also ser_'ed de facto as staff director of the Senate Special
Committee on Space and Aeronautics during 1958 when it considered the "Space Act.'"
• Willis H. Shapley was a member of the Bureau of the Budget during 1957-1958. where he even-
tually became director for space program coordination. Ira 1965 he moved to NASA as associate
deputy administrator, with his duties including supe,'vision of the public affairs, congressional
affairs, interagency affairs, and international affairs oftices.
• H. Guyford Stever was on the facuhy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology during the
Sputnik crisis and during the creation of NASA in 1957-1958. He became directly involved in the
"'Space Act" as a member of the Air" Force scientific advisor 7 board. He also served in a number of
other science policy capacities with the National Research Council and the National Science
Foundation, as well as science advisor to President Gerald Ford.
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• GlenP.WilsonwasastaffmemberfortheSenateduringtheSputnikcrisisandparticipatedin the
writingoftheNationalAeronauticsandSpaceActof1958aridlaterservedontheSenateCommittee
onAeronauticalndSpaceSciencesthroughoutitsentireexistencefiom1958until theSenatereor-
ganizationin 1977.
Thevaluableperspectivetheseindividualsprovidedeepenandexpandourunderstandingofthisimpor-
tanthistoricalevent.
Thisgatheringofparticipantswasorganizedthroughtheefh,rtsoftheSpacePolicyInstituteatThe
GeorgeWashingtonUniversityinWashington,D.C.,andtheLyndonBainesJohnsonPresidentialLibrary
in Austin,Texas.
This is theeighthin a seriesof specialstudiespreparedby the NASAHistol3'Division.The
Monographsin AerospaceHistoryseriesisdesignedtoprovideawidevarietyof investigationsrel-
ativeto thehistoryof aeronauticsandspace.Thesepublicationsareintendedtobetightlyfocusedin
termsof subject,relativelyshortin length, and reproduced in an inexpensive format to allow timely and
broad dissemination to researchers in aerospace history. Suggestions for additional publications in the
Monographs in Aerospace History series are welcome.
ROGER D. LAUNIUS
Chief Historian
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
May 25, 1998
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Preface and Acknowledgments
he idea for getting on the record the recollec, tions of those who had worked on space issues in the
U.S. Congress during the immediate post-Sputnik through the passage of the National Aeronautics
and Space Ac,t of 1958 came from Glen P. Wilson. Dr. Wilson, who in 1957 and 1958 was a junior
staff member working for Lyndon B. Johnson, had been involved in the U.S. space program since its ori-
gins, and he convinced the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University and the Lyndon
Baines Johnson I,ibrary that there was a story that had not been fully told about the role of the Congress,
and particularly of Senator Lyndon B. Johnson and those that worked with him, in the process that result-
ed in setting up a new civilian space agency in 1958. The two organizations at Glen's urging decided to
work together to bring together as many as possible of those who were involved in that process and to let
them reminisce about their involvement in the events of 1957 and 1958.
These reminiscences took the form of a three-hour workshop that was recorded on videotape in the
studios of GW Television on the campus of the George Washington University in downtown Washington,
D.C., on April 3, 1992. This document and the videotape of the workshop itself are being made available
to various archives and research centers concerned with space and with the major personalities of the time.
The workshop would not have been possible without the financial support of the Lyndon Bathes
Johnson Foundation and the personal involvement of the Director of the Johnson Library, Harry
Middleton, and his associate, Robert Hardesty. Kimberly Carter, Executive Aide at the Space Policy
Institute, managed the preparations for the workshop with skill and good cheer. Susan Brown and her
crew at GW television added professionalism to the videotaped production. The ability of the Space
Policy Institute to undertake worthwhile projects such as this is a result of the generosity of the several
corporate contributors to the lnstitute's work.
Of course, all of us involved in organizing this workshop owe great thanks to our seven participants,
both tor sharing their experiences with us and for the contributions they have made to their country, both
at the beginning of the Space Age and throughout their careers.
JOHN M. LOGSDON
Director
Space Policy Institute
George Washington University

Introduction
The October 4, 1957, launch hy tile Soviet Union of the tirst artificial Earth satellite, Sputnik 1, ¢:ame as
a shock to most in the United States. The fact that a Russian space launch was imminent was known to
individuals at top levels of government and the scientific community, but little had been done to prepare
for tile public reaction to that event. That reaction clearly surprised President Dwight Eisenhower and
his advisors. The reaction It) Sputnik shocked the American political syslenl into action. Within a year
after Sputnik, a comprehensive National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 had heen passed by
Congress, and signed by the President. This created a new space agency, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA), and important elements of both the civilian and milita U space program
had gotten a kick start.
Another of the impacts of Sputnik was to convince President Eisenhower that he needed direct access to
the advice of the scientific comnmnity. To do so, he created the post of Science Advisor to the Presitlent,
and he named James R. Killian, Jr., the President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), to
that post. Many years later, Dr. Killian wrote about the creation of the National Aeronautics and Space
Act._ He noted that many influences were brought 1o bear on the formulation of the legislation, as they
"i
While President l)wight D. Eisenhower had shown art itrter4"st in space activities, eslwciallyfor national defense objectives, prior to
the Ittunch ofSptlinik I on October l. 1957, he fitih, d to recognize the important psychological aJft, ct the Ixtunch of the Societ stttel-
lite would httre on tlw America. people. Iler_, he is shown in the Oval Office with the recovered nosecone frorn a Jupiter4"_ missile
carried 1,200 miles downrange on August 7. 1057. befl_re a national telerision ttudiettce. G_ASA photograph)
1. James R. Killian, Jr., Sputnik, Scientists, ttnd Eisenhower (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 1977).
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shouldhavebeen.Heobserved that the final act represented _ remarkable blending of the inte,ests,
needs, and objectives of the Administration, the Department of Defense, and the scientitic community.
Killian's observation was correct as far as it went, but it was not c:_mplete. There was another major actor
in the process of giving shape to the U.S. space program: the U.S. Congress. While there is much on tile
public record regarding the debates within the Eisenhower Administration on how best to organize the
U.S. space program, there has been relatively little attention paid to its legislative origins. That was the
basic rationale for this workshop: to provide some perspective on the role that Congress played in creat-
ing an enduring and productive fl'amework for" America's activities in space.
Many in Congress took on key roles, but perhaps the single eaost influential individual was Senate
Majority Leader Lyndon Baines Johnson. Senator Johnson was at his Texas ranch the night Sputnik was
launched, and from that night until he addressed the United Nations on the need for cooperation in the
peaceful uses of space, thirteen months later, LBJ was at the center of congressional debate over space.
It is thus appropriate that the Johnson Librau was a co-organizer of this event, and that several of Senator
Johnson's close associates participated in the workshop. The for,nat of the workshop was to begin wilh
one-on-one discussions with each of the seven individuals who ::ere able to be part of this workshop.
Then all of the participants came together for a concluding ro.andtable. Each participant played an
important role in the events of late 1957 and 1958. The goal of the workshop was to let them tell their
part of the story as they remember it.
Thus the following pages are a transcript of the workshop discussions, edited for purposes of clarity and
with addenda from the inte_'iewees. The interviewer is John M. Logsdon. In preparation fo, the work-
shop, Glen Wilson prepared an extremely useful background paper on "'How the U.S. Space Act Came
to Be." That paper is included as an Appendix to these proceedir gs.
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Individual Discussions
Conversation with George E. Reedy
Our first conversation is with George E. Reedy, who has had a distinguished career as an edu-
cator, author, and public servant. Mr. Reedy was, of course, press secretary and cons,ltant to
Lyndon Johnson. He later became Dean of the College of Journalism at Marquette University.
He is author of The Twilight of the Presidency and many other books and articles. During the
1950s, Mr. Reedy served on the staff of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee and from 1955
to 1960 was Staff Director of the Democratic Policy Committee of the Congress, one of the many
Congressional organizations that felt the strong influence of Lyndon Johnson.
Logsdon:
Reedy:
Logsdon:
Reedy:
Logsdon:
Mr. Reedy, thank you for joining us today.
Good to be here.
Give us a sense of how you and Senator Johnson interacted on the space issue in the
immediate aftermath of Sputnik and then as the space program took shape during 1958.
Well, in the immediate aftermath, for about two weeks 1 merely let the thing vegetate.
Senator Johnson had so many problems on his mind that I doubt whether he devoted too
much attention to it. We were both down in Texas. I was living in Austin there at the
time. We had some very difficult years ahead of us. The next year was going to be a cam-
paign year', which meant that the Senate would be very difficult to lead and for a while
I sort of put the space thing on the back burner. But what got me out of it was a visit
from Charles S. Brewton, who has now unfortunately passed away, but for whose politi-
cal acumen I had great deal of respect. I think that if there is a father to the Space Act
it was probably Charley Brewton, of whom very few people have ever heard. Charley had
been Senator" Lister Hill's administrative assistant. I had never known him to be wrong
in judging the public. He came down to see me, and said that the Space Act was so
tremendous. It could first of all clobber the Republicans, secondly lead to tremendous
advances, and, third, elect Lyndon Johnson as president. Well, I told him that Lyndon
Johnson was not interested in running for the presidency. He said that was all right with
him, he would settle for clobbering the Republicans. He was a Democrat. He insisted
we drive out of Austin and out into the hill country right around Austin. We found a lit-
tle mound where we could look and see hundreds of miles of practically nothing. He
began to talk about the space program: that man had really mastered the drift of it, the
poetry. He didn't know very much about outer space but he had grasped immediately the
fact that this was something that could change the whole way that we lived: it could
change our nation. He convinced me. I remember going back that night. My mind was
just full of it. I sat up most of the night reading everything that I could. And I wrote the
Senator a long memorandum the next day, which went beyond Charley's thinking
because I knew a little more about space.
This was October 17?
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Reedy: Right. October 17. 1957. I wrote a rather lengthy memorandum. In that memorandum.
I said that this would go far beyond a mere deft nse thing. The immediate public reac-
tion would probably be fear. but that long range, this could be one of the great dividing
lines in American and world history, the whole history of humanity. 1 remember the
Senator as being a little bit reluctant at first, bet: ause he had so mail), other problems on
his mind and they were pressing him. Finally, we went to Washington. where we met with
Senator Russell and 1 have a feeling Senator Bridges--my memoo"s not clear'. We had
a vet)' private briefing, in the Pentagon, on the state of America's rocket program. As I
remember, there were some rather amusing aspects to it. That is where we first learned
about Atlas and Polaris and all of those things. It became apparent to us, at the time,
that the Defense Department was thinking solely in military terms, which was not real-
ly what we were after. We thought that something more than that was in effect. So, at the
end of the hearing, we went back to the Hill and met in Senator Russell's office. What
Senator Russell did was to authorize Johns3n to use the Senate Preparedness
Subcommittee to hold some hearings into this whole question. That Subcommittee had
been defunct for a number of years. It was appointed, originally, to look into events in
Korea during the Korean War. V_% started gathering people that could be useful.
Eventually this led to the first set of hearings at which Edwin Weisel in New _brk acted
as a consuhant counsel, and Cy Vance. who was ,rot of Ed Weisel's law thm. also was an
assistant consuhing counsel. That brought Eilene Galloway into it and quite a number
of other people.
Logsdon: These were the hearings in November-December 1957 that led to a set of recommen-
dations in early January 1958?
Reedy: Right. Those were the hearings.
Logsdon: And then Senator Johnson went before the Denlocratic Policy Committee and spoke on
the space issue?
Reedy: Right.
Logsdon: Were you directly involved with that?
Reedy: Only to the extent of distributing the speech. Wfmt had happened was that the speech
was written by Horace Busby. h was a remarkable speech, sort of an overpowering
speech.
Logsdon: In Twilight of the Presidency you call it a "compelling power."
Reedy: Right. which is a good way to describe it. One fet almost that one were listening to an
Old Testament prophet. I think that was a very important influence in selling the space
program. We were already running into some It, rabies, because it was apparent that
President Eisenhower was very reluctant and so was the Pentagon to open this up to the
civilian exploration program. They were thinking almost entirely in terms of weaponry.
The weaponry was rather well developed. The one real advantage that the Russians had
over us, at that point, was that they had develope,i rockets which were much more pow-
erful than ours.
Logsdon: Because they had a heavier warhead?
INDIVIDUALDISCUSSIONS
No one understood the intpartance of the lttanch of Sputnik for the psyche of the American people more effectively than Senate
Majority Leader l,yndtm II. Johnson. Itere he is shown as president on September 15, 196_, at a meeting hosted by N,IS.'I. the
agency that he helped to create u_ith the National Aeronaatics ttnd Space Act of 1958. (NASA I_hotograph 64-II-2360)
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Reedy: No, just because they started earlier. As nearly as we can make out what happened, the
Russians, at some point, discovered that they cottld never catch up to us in powered air-
craft. You know, once you get a momentum going.
Logsdon: Sure, and so they wanted to make a leap.
Reed)': They wanted to leapfrog and they leapfrogged to rocketry. If we were to get our rockets
into space we had to put three rockets together to lift one small payload that the
Russians could lift with one rocket. I think that to a great extent the Pentagon wanted to
keep the thing as secret as they possibly could. ]'hey were also worried about the diver-
sion of attention from weaponry into what they thought were nonproductive fields.
Logsdon: Space spectaculars.
Reedy: Right. I remember there were some remarks that ieaked out of the White House. I think
it was Sherman Adams, Eisenhower's top assistant, who made some remark about
Lyndon Johnson playing outer space basketball. Eisenhower, at one point is supposed to
have said, "Lyndon Johnson can keep his head in the stars if he wants. I'm going to keep
my feet on the ground." There was very distinct reluctance for them to proceed, which,
to me, raises a very interesting point. More than anything else, I'm a political theoreti-
cian and historian and this is one of the very fe_ instances in this century, I can only
think of three or four, where the initiative for a very major law and a very major change
was the initiative of Congress.
Logsdon: Congress?
Reedy: Yes, Congress rather than the President.
Logsdon: Congress really put the pressure on the White Ho;ase?
Reedy: Right.
Logsdon: I think the White House had to respond and brou_._ht a Space Act up, but it is because
Congress was insistent.
Reedy: Right, and the Space Act was not a very good act that they brought up. Again, I think
Eisenhower was afraid of having an agency that could get out of control. I don't think
any of his motives, by the way, were bad or venal or anything like that. I think it was just
a difference of opinion; and, therefore, he tried to keep the agency as much under con-
trol as possible and as much under the control of the military as he possibly could. You
know, as a rule, if you take a look at a legislat ve year, the legislation consists of
Congress reacting to what the President proposes.
Logsdon: Yes, to White House initiatives.
Reedy: Which doesn't mean the President gets evei'ything iae wants, not by a long shot. But, he
has the power of the initiative. That's the one real power of the Presidency, by the way.
There are not many others.
Logsdon: It is agenda setting.
Reedy: Right. Most of the powers of the Presidency are mythical, as every President has dis-
covered. But here you had one of the only three or four instances I can think of in this
century where something originated with Congress.
Logsdon:
Reedy:
Logsdon:
Reedy:
Logsdon:
INDIVIDUALDISCUSSIONS
HowengagedidSenatorJohnsonstaywiththespaceissueaftertheseearlymonthsin
1958.Wasit acontinuingconcern?Ofcourse,hehadlotsofother things on his mind.
Right. It was a continuing concern, to a point. One of the problems here is it was an
unusually difficult year. You have to realize that we were engaged in an election year.
And the Senate and the House are always more difficult to manage. The Senate is a lit-
tle bit easier than the House because only one third of the Senate is up in any particu-
lar election. There were many other things during that year'. We also had a mild
recession that came later in the year that meant that we had to do something about the
economy, jump starting it. that sort of thing. I think for a while, Lyndon Johnson didn't
get distracted from the space program, but he had many other things competing with it.
But, then, later in the year, and I believe you were involved, Senator Johnson was asked
by President Eisenhower to go up to the United Nations and talk about the internation-
al aspects of the space program.
Right, which was very fitting. You know, it was rather strange. If one looks at the press
of the period, it became apparent immediately that Lyndon Johnson was the major inno-
vator in this whole thing. I can still remember one marvelous cartoon that appeared in
the Baltimore Sun showing Lyndon Johnson and the rest arriving like visitors from
Mars. You know, "Take me to your leader," that kind of stuff, meaning the space pro-
gram. He was the ideal man to make that statement before the United Nations. because
you could really say that he was speaking for the country. He had originated this: it had
been accepted by the nation: so he was the presenter.
Well, there's lots more I guess we could say, but we've run out of time for today. We'll
get a chance when we all come back together. And thank you very much.
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Conversation with Willis H. Shapley
Willis Shapley is the prototype of the anonymous but remarkably effective and injhtential civil
sert,ant. Willis came to Washington in 1942 front his graduate studies at the University" of
Chicago for what he thought was a brief wartime tour of duty in the Bureau of the Budget. But
he has net;er left Washington. He stayed with the Bureau of the Budget for twenty-three years,
specializing in defense issues, and, after 1957, the space program. Then he became a senior
staff advisor to NA SA's Administrators from 1965 to 1975 attd was called back from retirement
after the Challenger accident to help stabilize NASA and the space program. In the post-Sputnik
White House, the Bltreatt of the Budget had an important role in shaping the Adntinistration's
proposais fl_r how to organize the nation's space effort, and Willis Shap_y was in the midst of
those discussions.
l,ogsdon:
Shal_ley:
Thank you for joining us today, Willis. What _as your role in that immediate post-
Sputnik period in thinking through how to respond to what the nation needed in space?
Well. I and my colleagues were a part of the Executive Office of the President and so
setting policy direction and deciding political re, lotions were really beyond our scope.
Of eottrse, we all had personal ideas of one sort or another but as the Athninistration
position, as the rec'ord shows, changed gradual y over the period that w_'re talking
!
_illis Sh¢q, ley httd been a member of the Bureaa of the Budget during 1957-1958, where he eventually becttme director fi, r space
program coordintltion, lit 1965, he matted to NASA as associate deputy administrator, with his duties ineludittg sapert,Lsion of the
public aJ']_zirs, congressionrtl ojf_tirs, interttgency tsffairs, and international affairs ._ffices. lie is shown here being sworn in to his
:_,'_IS..I position h)" .Idministrtltor Jt_mes E. 1Fehb. (.N)ISA photograph)
Logsdon:
Shapley:
Logsdon:
Shapley:
Logsdon:
Shapley:
Logsdon:
Shapley:
INDIVIDUAl, DISCUSSIONS
about, our role was mainly to help steer it in what seemed to be the right direction, and
to find ways of dealing with the substantive policy matters that needed to be addressed.
Well, talk about the kind of changing forces in guidance that you people were getting
from the political leadership.
I think I should first say that there were a couple of things in the background that intlu-
enced things a lot more than, o," at least as much as what was happening in space. A few
years before Sputnik, perhaps about a year and a half. the President had approved giv-
ing the ballistic missile programs top national priority. That was taken ve U seriously.
The highest national priority started out being given to the Atlas missile, the Titan, and
later the Polaris when it came along.
Thor and Jupiter were in there, too.
My job in the Bureau of the Budget. as you mentioned, was in what was called the mil-
itary division at that time. _'_ had a way of working jointly with the Department of
Defense. We actually served de facto as staff under the Secretary of Defense as well as
staff for the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. These were two separate roles which
we played. In the case of ballistic missiles, the decision was made to set up what was
called a red-line organization--the Ballistic Missile Committee--to get all the bureau-
cracy out of the way and to have the principal officials meet once a week or every ten
clays to make the decisions right in the room to keep the programs going. The Bureau of
the Budget was one member of that. I was the alternate to the Assistant Director who
was our member, which meant thal I was in the midst of it. Our policies at the time were
not a matter of emphasis on military as against civilian as far as space was concerned;
it was firmly believed and directed by the President that the ballistic missile programs
should be top priority. As you may recall, he had been somewhat pushed into that posi-
tion earlier, but now this was a very real concern. And so, in the early clays of Vanguard,
anything to be done about space was going to have to be done without interfering with
the ballistic missile program.
But clearly Sputnik changed the calculus a little?
The system reacted very promptly to Sputnik. I think it was less than a month after
Sputnik or even less than that; perhaps it was after Sputnik 2. The ballistic missile
committee and the Secreta U of Defense ordered yon Braun's people to go ahead with a
satellite. A few weeks later, the decision was made to establish ARPA as a whole new
agency in the Department of Defense, something that would have been unthinkable
without Sputnik because it cut across all the smwices.
When ARPA was set up, was there a thought that that might be the space agency?
I don't think the idea of a need for a space agency or that there would be one had per-
meated enough people's thinking at that time. ARPA was something that needed to be
done. It was the quickest way of doing it. The wonderful thing about business in those
days was this could be done. It was effectively done even before the various congres-
sional catch-up things were clone. And, of course, nobody was against doing it. They got
people right away. Roy Johnson was the first Director, I believe. It went to work. _} very
carefully designed the language setting it up so that it wouldn't necessarily be a perma-
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Logsdon:
Shapley:
Logsdon:
Shapley:
Logsdon:
Shapley:
Logsdon:
Shapley:
nent bureaucracy; it could take money from the services and transfer it somewhere else:
it could take its own money and give it to the services.
It was the place that the space program was at least temporarily placed in early 1958.
That's right. Certainly space and, incidentally, anti-missile programs were put there, too,
which shows that the focus wasn't entirely space. Now the other main thing in the back-
ground, I think, is that during this period there were successive waves of unification in
the Department of Defense and it is hard to believe, from the way things are now, how
vigorous, dirty even, the interservice fighting ir_ the Department of Defense was and how
every step to increase the authority of the Secretary of Defense over the Departments in
any way ran into all sorts of resistance, end ruas to Congress, and everything. And this
is another matter in which we in the Bureau ff the Budget were very much involved:
helping strengthen the Department of Defense. There were successive reorganizations of
the R&D function in the Office of the Secreta_ of Defense, establishment of the Special
Assistant for Guided Missiles, William M. Holaday, and other things of that sort.
So in the middle of this comes the space issue and the need to respond.
Right. The point I'd like to emphasize is that the President, assisted by the Bureau of
the Budget, the Secretary of Defense, and others were really all on the same side
throughout this whole exercise of the response to Sputnik. There were really no policy
differences. People over in the Pentagon were lelying on us to help them make the deci-
sions they made, and on the question of wheth_r it should be a civilian agency or not. It
was clear that there was going to be an agency; this was maybe in November. There was
not the slightest doubt anywhere that it would be a civilian agency among the people
that were controlling things. Now, the Air Force had a slightly different idea. The record
shows that in November, General Putt in the Air Force set up a whole Directorate of
Astronautics. Three days later, Secretary McElroy abolished it. Although there may
have been other considerations, that was a symptom of what the Air Force expectations
were. The Secretary of Defense wanted to prev,'nt any of the services, especially the Air
Force, from running away on its own on getting this new issue or any other issue. I think
this background is very much part of the whole picture.
Well, the final recommendation to President Eisenhower that a new civilian agency
based on the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics came in the form of a March
5, 1958, memorandum. It came from the Advisory Committee on Government
Organization, Nelson Rockefeller's group; but, it also came from BOB and the new
President's Science Advisor. What's some of tl_e background of that recommendation?
Well, I have to confess that until somebody told me about that recommendation in
preparing for this workshop, I had not really remembered it. I guess it was a significant
external event that reflected basic decisions that had been made several weeks and
months before that. The formal status, as I rec ill, was that the President appointed Mr.
Killian to be his Science Advisor; Mr. Killian lad a Space Subcommittee.
Ed Purcell headed the Space Subcommittee?
Yes, Ed Purcell, and many other people. We in :he Bureau of the Budget sat in with them
on many of their meetings. When they turned to organization, we briefed them on our
views--more on that in a moment--and explained what the pros and cons were. And so
8
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This was the official seal for the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), which was established by act of Congress
in March 1915. The seal depicts the first flight of the Wright brothers in December 1903. The NACA made up the core of the new
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. (NASA photograph 90-H-537)
Logsdon:
Shapley:
by the time the memorandum was written and signed, the whole thing was really sort of
a done deal. Although I'm not sure everybody knew it was a done deal, it certainly was.
All right. You wanted to talk a bit about what the Bureau of the Budget brought to
this discussion.
In the Bureau of the Budget at that time, besides the responsibilities for budgets, orga-
nization, and programs in the individual agencies, it also had the responsibility for seek-
ing to preserve the integrity of organization of the government as a whole. In those days,
there was a standing piece of legislation that was renewed each year called the
Reorganization Act, which gave the President broad authority to reorganize the govern-
ment, subject only to congressional veto. There was a very high caliber professional
group in the Bureau called the Government Organization Branch, and whenever there
was going to be any reorganization proposed or considered they were the professionals
that dealt with it. At this time, the head of that whole Division was William F. Finan. He
assigned as Project Officer Alan Dean, who was the staff person involved. From the other
side of the Bureau of the Budget, where I was, in effect, the chief person involved in
space matters, we assigned one or two people. Wreatham Gathright and, I think, one
other sat with the group. You are going to have other members of the group on the pro-
gram here a little bit later. Their job was to actually draft a bill and that is what they did.
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lx_gsdon: Now, thai bill was sent to tile Congress in April and then both the Senate and House had
hearings and proposed a bunch of changes. How vigorously were those changes resist-
ed at the Executive end?
Shapley: Virtually, not at all. as far as I recall, ahhough I should say that I was not directly
involved in the relations with Congress during this period.
Logsdon: That would have been Bryce Harlow's office.
Shapley: Normally a bill drafted in the Bureau of the Budget would be defended by the people
who were going to implement it. In this case that was Dr. Dryden from NACA, and other
witnesses. The heart of the bill that I was concerned with, beside just the technicalities
and formalities you need for a new agency, was the question of the role of the
Department of Defense. People were for a civilian agency, for all sorts of reasons. In
some parts of the arena, there were people who denied or greatly underestimated the
importance, long-run, of space to the Department of Defense. This was something which
] can truthfully say, ! had some slight glimmer of. although at that time no great convic-
tion. And so the way the bill was drafted, the language prepared, which was in the orig-
inal Administration bill and remained in the final one said that space activities will be
under a civilian agency except for activities primarily related to the Department of
Defense. Well, what happened in the Congress, basically, was that the bill spelled out
the role of the Department of Defense in much greater detail. Now, this was not some-
thing that the Administ,ation resisted, except ot_ a sort of vague ground of principle.
They regretted it, because one of the guiding lights in writing reorganizations from the
Executive Branch standpoint, is to leave everybocy flexibility. I think it can be said that
all the changes that were made in the bill, most of which were in my opinion improve-
ments or cla,'ifications, authorized things that could have been done anyway. They were
covered by autho,ities that the agencies already had. 1 think the Defense Department
could have clone evexything authorized in the firal Act under the Administration bill
(except maybe setting up that military liaison comminee which turned out not to be a
vel 7 useful thing and was dropped).
Logsdon: Through this whole process, and, in particular, when the Administration was considering
the bill and a new agency, Congress, particularly Preparedness Investigating
Subcommittee, was conducting hearings? Was there an interaction? Was there much
influence on the part of the Congress, or were you operating pretty much within the
Executive Branch?
Shapley: '_11 I was. I'm sure people were reading the hearings as a standard procedure and
othe,s ira the Bureau were working with Congress. llut basically, I think, there was a cer-
tain amount of executive arrogance, if you please. We saw organization as our business
and felt we knew how to organize agencies just as well as anybody else: while they also
felt they understood the problem as far as setting ap a new agency was concerned. But
all this is completely separate, really, from the que _tions of how emotional you get about
space, how important space was. how big a deal. I think the Administration clearly
underestimated the public: impact of space. On the other hand, the bill as it came out
has stood up pretty well. So maybe the work on the bill was not all bad.
Logsdon: Right. Thank you very much fi)r being with us today.
Shapley: Thank you.
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Conversation with Gerald W. Siegel
Our next guest, Gerald Siegel is a lawyer by training. During the 1950s he served in various staff
positions in the Senate, including counsel to the Democratic Policy Cotnmittee and the
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee. tte was the de facto staff director of the Senate
Special Committee on Space and Astronautics as it considered the Administration's proposal for
a Space Act during thefirst halfof1958. Mr. Siegel left the Senate shortly thereafter to lecture
for three years at Harvard and then served as the Vice President and Chief Counsel of the
Washington Post until his retirement.
Logsdon:
Siegel:
Logsdon:
Siegel:
Logsdon:
Siegel:
Logsdon:
Siegel:
Logsdon:
Glad you could be with us today, Mr. Siegel. 1 understand that on the night that Sputnik
went up, October 4, 1957, you were at the Johnson ranch working with the Senator. What
kind of reaction did he have?
It was a very interesting reaction. My wife and I had gone to Austin to explore the pos-
sibility of moving to Texas to work for Mrs. Johnson and her television station. I had told
the Senator a year before that I was going to leave the staff, and so, when we got the
news, probably by telephone, as he frequently did when he had things that he wanted to
mull over, he said, "let's take a walk to Cousin Oriole's." Cousin Oriole was a legitimate
cousin, who lived on the ranch about five hundred yards or so away in a small house,
and was an unlettered but very wise woman who fi'equently was the environment
provider for much of the cerebration that he would undertake. So we went down there
and talked. He thought through what he wanted to do. I think, unlike what George
Reedy's recollection is, that at this time, the space program was not born in anybody's
mind, that l'm aware of, who was dealing with what we then did. The Senator decided to
call Senator Russell and Senator Bridges, that night.
Right, both were on the Armed Services Committee.
And Johnson got approval to launch an investigation by the Preparedness Subcommittee
into the missile and satellite program.
Right. The night of Sputnik.
The very night of Sputnik. Either that night or, perhaps, the next clay we called Soils
Horowitz, one of the lawyers in \r_tshington with our group, and had him begin to set up
appointments for briefings for us. These uhimately came about. I went back to
Washington probably on the 5lh or 6th of October and stayed there. At that time the
Senator was back and forth.
But the context was a security fear?
I think that, one, there was feat" because of this sudden demonstration of Russian technical
expertise in a field where we didn't anticipate it, and, two. the military implications of it
were foremost in our minds. I remember one of us saying, it wasn't the satellite we were
concerned about, it was what got it up there.
The rocket.
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Siegel: Becauseif youcanachievea missilelaunchof thatmagnitu(le,yuucanlauncha
thermonuclearbomb``'elyeasily.
Logsdon: Indeed.
Siegel: Thiswaswhatwasforemost.In averyshorttimetheAdministration.I think,probal)ly
aheadofevenCharleyBrewtonwhohadtheta,-kof persuadingGeorge.who.in lurn.
wasveryinfluentialwiththeSenator,everybodybegantoreflectupon,tothebestoftheir
ability,withlimitedif anyknowledge,whataspaceprogram ightconsistof. We draft-
ed no bills. There were Senators who did and dropped some in the hopper in the Senate.
\Ve waited. 1 don't recall if there was much interchange during the period in January and
February and even into March between the Senator and the White House. If there ,,,,'as
an.',', he had put me together with Bryce Harlow during the missile and satellite investi-
gation. Bryce was our contact on such troublesome issues as the Gaither Report, which
was disclosed and wasn't supposed to be.
Logsdon: That's right. Which was a report that said American bases were vulnerable to Soviet
attack.
Siegel: Right. Some people wanted to believe it and some people didn't.
Logsdon: Talk a bit about the Preparedness Subcommittee hearings.
Siegel: Well, that subcommittee, as George Reedy ind cated, was born in 1950 when Ko,ea
broke out and it did a large number of widespread studies that were issued in the f<>rm
of reports, all unanimous, and all contributing, I think, to the election of Dwight
Eisenhower. The Democrats really weren't very happy with it. The Sut,committee did
stay in existence actually somewhere into 1956 or 1957, but it had dropped its activity
considerably, but it had conducted the MacArthur Hearings. There was a slight fracas
that came in 1951 when George came aboard. It did a number of important studies in
the missile field in those early years.
Logsdon: In this immediate aftermath of Sputnik in Noverlber and December there were intense
hearings with lots and lots of witnesses called.
Siegel: Well, the November/December/January hearings were indeed intense and they inw_lvcd
some of the best scientilic minds in the country, experts in the military who had been on
missile programs for military purposes.
l,ogsdon: So, the central thrust of those hearings really was what did this mean for U.S. security.
Siegel: There was one question: why did the Russians beat us with [ou," effort on] this little
Geophysical Year Navy project that was supposed to launch an eleven pound satellite'.*
Logsdon: This was the Navy's Vanguard project. The Senat,." formed a Special Committee on Space
aml Astronautics, I think in anticipation of what the Administration was going to do.
Siegel: ()h. 1 think one of the recommendations by the title the nfissile and satellite investigation
ended was that we had to do something about a Sl+.ace exploration program. What we were
going to do was not well fmTnulated at this point but it was Senator Johnson's idea that
there had to be a Blue Ribbon Committee and. indeed, it was a Blue Ribl.m C.mmittee.
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The official Americ.n entrant into the scient{fie stttellite effort ttndertaken as n result of the lntern.tion.I Geophysict:l }Oar (ICY)
in 1957 1958 wits Project [:_tngt:txrd. .,is rtn ottentpt to detnonstrtlte parity with the Soviet Slmtt_ik sttcrress, on December 6, 1957. the
I/hired Strttes attempted to Iozlnr'll t: _ln_tstxrtI srltellite, with spectartdtsr Itwk qf sttcr'ess. :4 mtdfltnction in rhe first stage caused the
vehicle to explode two seconds qftt, r Ittttnctt. This fltilt_re gt:ve added itnlWtt:s to tht, I,,gislotive e_'fort to create ¢: Selmrttte ageac)"
dedicated to spttce explor¢:tioo, t N:IS_4 photogrtq,h 67 11-1563)
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Logsdon: Talk a little bit about the composition of the membership.
Siegel: The members were the Chairman and ranking members of the committees having some
jurisdiction in the vague area of space exploration: Appropriations, Foreign Relations,
Armed Services, Commerce.
Logsdon: Senator Johnson was the Chair of the Committee. What was the Committee doing before
the Administration bill came up?
Siegel: The Special Committee?
Logsdon: Yes. Was it just getting itself organized and ready?
Siegel: I'll tell you my recollection, that is that Senator Johnson and Senator Bridges spent some
time interviewing for a Counsel for the Committee. After talking with several people
Senator Bridges suggested to Senator Johnson that they should save money and just let
Gerry run it. And that's just what they decided to do. We never hired a Counsel.
Logsdon: The Administration bill came up in April; you had already laid a pretty firm foundation with
the Preparedness Hearings, so you had, I think, four or five days of hearings on the bill.
Siegel: Most of us had never seen or heard about it and I think the Senator's characterization of
it was that it was a bill formulated on a motorcycle going through the Pentagon.
Logsdon: So the reception of the Administration's bill wasn': too positive?
Siegel: At first it was not, but I think that ultimately it was determined that the basic substantive
provisions of the Administration bill, and what the Senate Committee would want to see
in such a bill, were not too different. Eilene Galloway did some early analysis of the bill
and it began to emerge that there were some aspects of it that were not to the liking of
the members of the Committee, or for the most part, perhaps, Senator Johnson, the
Chairman. This was frequently a one or two man kind of operation. What I am drawing
upon comes from a symposium that was held in 51eptember of 1959 by the American
Political Science Association, with Bill Finan, wl"o Willis Shapley mentioned, as the
principal speaker. I spoke, along with a number ,ff other people, of our recollections
which were a good deal sharper than mine today about the organization of the program
for space exploration in this country.
Logsdon: Is this something you wanted to read for our record?
Siegel: I would just try to summarize briefly, [our concerns included]: The lack of a specifically
designated authority having major policy responsii_ility for the overall national space
program, which is the birth of the Space Council The ambiguity of the language in
Section II of the proposed bill in which it was intended to set forth the respective juris-
dictions of the Pentagon and the civilian agency, always fuzzy, always worrisome.
Although, and I might mention, from what I have read, President Eisenhower was real-
ly only interested in the military aspects in the earl) stages. The absence of specific and
appropriately qualified authority for international c,_operation was not taken care of in
the bill. The absence of any provisions relating to p_operty rights and inventions, patent
provisions, had to come. The House took the leadership. I worked with the staff person
over there all the time, and we didn't put it in the Senate bill, we left it to be worked out
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inconference.Weproposedtogivethenewspaceagencysalariesequivalenttothoseinpri-
vate industry. _tbusee, even thirty-four years ago, we worried about compensation of executives.
Talk a little bit about the relations between the Senate and the House Committees as the
Congress tried to agree on its view on a Space Act.
The only thing I recall is that the thrust of the House approach began to point toward an
agency headed by a commission as against an administrator.
A sin_e headed agency? The Senate and Executive Branch preferred the Administration's bill?
We worked that out by dropping the likeness to the Atomic Energy Commission.
Ultimately Senator Johnson went to see President Eisenhower and they reached some areas
of compromise, so that there could be an agreed upon bill. Can you give us any insight?
He didn't tell me he was going; or, if he did, I've forgotten it, because I didn't go.
Okay, so this was a one-on-one meeting?
You know as much about it as I do.
Thank you for sharing your memories with us this afternoon.
Happy to do it.
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Conversation with Glen P. Wilson
Glen P. Wilson is,first of all, probably the primary moving spirit behind today's et,ent. Glen con-
r'inced us that there was an important atzd untold story about Congressional influence in the
early days of the U.S. space program. ! think that what we've already heard today validates
Glen's point. Glen l_"ilson has his doctorate in psychology. He came to Washington in 1955 to
work fi_r Lyndon Johnson. In 1957 in the wake of Sputnik, Glen was assigned by LBJ to the staff
of the Preparedness Int,estigating Subcommittee. When the Senate established a Special
Committee on Space and Astronautics, in early 1958, Glen became one of its initial staff mem-
bers. It was that Committee, of course, that considered the Administration's proposal for a new
space agency. When a standing Committee on Space was established by the Senate later in 1959,
Glen joined its staJf and served until the Committee was abolished by reorganization in 1977. So
Glen truly represents the continuity in Congressional space a_fairs. Sittce lettving the Senate, Dr.
Wilson has made intportant contributions to space education and public involvement in space:
first, as originator of the NASA Space Shuttle Studettt Involvement Program, then, as Executive
l)irector of the National Splice Societ), st position fronz which he retired several years ago.
Logsdon:
Wilson:
Glen. thanks for joining us this afternoon. I think you have a lot to add to the record.
Give its, first a sense of the environment sun'ounding the Preparedness Investigating
Subcomnfittee Hearings. What was the goal of Senator Johnson and of the Hearings?
Why were there so many witnesses? There were seventy-three witnesses over the course
of the hearings. \_'hs that phmned at the start?
Well. Sputnik hit \X.ashington quite hard and. as h;,s been brought out aheady, some peo-
ple at the White House tended to downplay the ae_tievement. Clarence l'{andle, who was
a special assistant to President Eisenhowe, called it a silly bauble, and so forth. There
are a 1o| of quotes that I have written in my paper. 2 But the)' could not keep down the
public concern about it. The newspapers, of course, played it up quite vigorously. It was
front page stuff practically every day [or weeks. ]bu've heard from Gen T Siegel how
Senator Johnson tirxt heard about this and reall_ picked up the ball and ran with it.
There was no question about who was tirst in getting on with this job. There have been
some people who said Johnson was slow to get sta_ted, and the record shows that that is
anything but the truth. The truth ix that he was the tirst man to do this. l'm not quite sure
that they had decided when they' were going to have hearings while they were doing all
this conferring during the month of October of 1957, but Sputnik 2. which came on
November 3. 1957. absolutely made the deeisior for them. if they had not aheady. It
really reinforced the fact because it weighed so much more than even the lirst one.
which was a shock, because even the first Sputnik weighed alniost nine timex more than
the one that we had planned to put up. So there uas a feeling of excitement and of cri-
sis because of the military seeurity angle thal we've talked about. I think that when
Senator Johnson brought Ed V_,eisel down. lie told him that it is only going to be flit" a
week or teu days. Mr. \X'eise[ duly set up in the I¢layflower Hotel and I don't think he
thought lie was going have to stay there that long. But as they talked to potential wit-
2. Gh'n P. _'il_.on. "tlmv the t.S. Space Act (]am,' *1;,Be." .kpril 3. 1992. Appendix B.
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Glen P. g"ilsoo w,s a staff member for the Senate during the Sputnik crisis and participated in the writing of the National
Aerona,tics ,ttd Space .4_t of 1958 ,nd later served on the Senate Committee on Aeronantical attd Space Sciences throaghout its
entire existe,ce froot 19.58 ,ntil the Senate reorganization in 1977. (NASA photograph)
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Logsdon:
nessesit sortofgrew.Theydiscoveredthattherewerealotmoreanglesthatneededto
belookedinto.Andsotheywentonwiththehearings.IncidentallyMr.Weisel,atfirst,
hadsaidthathewantedtoputthehearingsoffuntilafterthefirstoftheyearbutI knew
whentheyweregoingtostart--whenLyndonJohnsonsaidtheyweregoingtostart.They
startedonthetwenty-fifthofNovember.Thetimingwasjustperfectbecauseit grabbed
all theattentionin thenewspapersandtelevision.It hit thepublicconsciousnesspre-
holiday:it didn'tgetmixedupinChristmas.
Sputnik,atleastin retrospect,wasinterpretedasafailureof U.S.society,a failureof
oureducationsystem.It ledtotheNationalDefenseEducationAct.Doyouthinkthe
Subcommittee'sworkcontributedtothesensethatit wasnotonlyaSovietachievement,
butaU.S.failure?
Wilson:
Logsdon:
Wilson:
Logsdon:
Wilson:
Logsdon:
Wilson:
Logsdon:
Wilson:
Logs(Ion:
Wilson:
Well, I think as George Reedy said in his October 17th memo, the idea behind the
Hearings was to bring out the facts, not try to look for scapegoats. Let's educate the
American people about what's happening here. i_don't think that many of us who were
there at the time really realized the impact that this was going to have. I mean, the
Hearings were held in the famous caucus room in the old Senate Office Building, where
a lot of famous hearings were held--the MacAr_:hur Hearings and so forth. Anyway, it
was absolutely jam packed in that place. It had lots of attention.
The Committee produced, I think, twenty-three recommendations, three of which had to
do with space, and the rest had to with other as_:ects of preparedness. What would you
say were the major impacts of the Committee's w,_rk?
I believe there were seventeen recommendations. Of the seventeen, three of them related
specifically to the space program. The rest of them related to the military or missile pro-
gram and so forth. But perhaps the one was mosl closely associated to space called for
work to stzut at once on the development of a rocket motor with a million pounds of
thrust. The two other ones involved accelerating and expanding research and develop-
ment programs and providing funding on a long-term basis and improving control and
administration within the Department of Defense, or through the establishment of an
independent agency.
So that was considered an option at this point?
Yes, absolutely. And then the last one was to lout more effort to the development of
manned missiles, meaning satellites.
Humans in space?
Yes, humans in space.
At that point a separate space agency was considered an option from the Senate's point
of view. Was it a preferred option?
Well, that wasn't the focus of those hearings.
They weren't concerned with organization?
That is correct. It was not a set of hearings designed to ask what kind of Federal orga-
nization we needed for all this, although in the hearings the topic came up several times.
Nelson Rockefeller was asked directly whether space should be under civilian or mili-
tary c<mt,(,l. He said. "Tll pass on that."
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Logsdon:
Wilson:
Logsdon:
Wilson:
Logsdon:
Wilson:
Logs<Ion:
Wilson:
Logsdon:
Wilson:
Logsdon:
Wilson:
Logsdon:
Wilson:
Because it hadn't been decided at that point?
That is correct.
Well, you've heard what Gen'y Siegel had to say about the Special Committee on Space
and Astronautics, of which you were one of the early staff members. What do you have
to add to that in terms of getting that Committee organized and up and running?
Well, the beginning of Januat T marked a new session of Congress. Eveubody who had
anything in mind about the space program put a bill into the hopper. Senator Anderson
put a bill in to give space to the Atomic Energy Committee. Other Senators put bills in
to give it to the Commerce Committee or whatevm; and it was reaching a point of near
chaos, l,yndon Johnson stepped in on Febrva U 5, 1958, and dropped a resolution in the
hopper to create the Special Commiuee which was a Blue Ribbon Committee. And,
again, to emphasize how Mr. Johnson ran things in those days, he introduced it on
Februa U 5th: it passed February 6th.
He was, after all, the Majority I,eader in addition to evm.'ything else.
That is right. And Gerald Siegel, of course, was involved. The committee had its first
organizational meeting, I believe, February 20th or something like that. There was a
period of' sort of digesting the bills and so forth.
As fat as you know. was there any interaction with the White House? As you probably
knew, the Administration was developing a proposal.
1 can't answer that point directly. Perhaps Lyndon Johnson knew. I did not come on the
staff until March the twenty-third, I think it was.
Just a week or two before the Administration bill came up. Describe the dynamics with-
in the Congress and between the Congress and the White House that led, finally, to the
July 29th Space Act.
The Administration sent the bill down, and it had rmmerous flaws in it. because it had
been done rather hastily. Eilene Galloway, whom you will talk to a little bit later,
immediately went to work to analyze the bill. She wrote ave U lengthy and perceptive
memorandum about the faults in the Administration proposal. 3"hen the House
Committee started its hearings, and had a long set of hearings.
Right, because they had not had the investigating background.
That is correct. They did not have the background that had come fiom the Preparedness
Subcommittee Hearings. So there was some interaction. But I cannot tell about it, I was
mostly a spear-carrier in those days, taking care of the records to see that stuff got to the
printers and that sort of business. So 1 wasn't involved in anything high level.
Let's shift focus a little bit. What about the issues as it became clear that there was going
to be a space agency and Congress had to set itself up to deal with this new area of activ-
ity and new organization. What were the issues there?
Well, this is a very interesting story. As you've heard, the members of the House
Committee had in mind something that was more like the Atomic Ene,gy Conmaission.
ahhough that was uhinmtely dropped from the bill. That carried over then to how they
were going to handle it in lhe Congress. and so they proposed a Joint Committee. It was
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l,ogsdon:
Wilson:
I.ogsdon:
Wilson:
l_ogsdon:
a very powerful committee, the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, and they wanted to
duplicate that. The bill that passed the committee unanimously with a Joint Committee
in it. but something happened between there a1_d the time it got to the House tloor. That
something. ! believe, was a phone call from Lyndon Johnson to Sam Rayburn. They
talked eve,), day. anyway. Mr. Rayburn was well known for being opposed to Joint
Committees. 1 think Mr. Johnson must have brought it to M,'. Rayburn's attention that
there was a Joint Committee in that bill was coming up on the House floo,. As a conse-
quence of that. that provision was dropped as a Comminee amendment on the House
floor. In the meantime, the staff of out Committee had been looking at the work that the
House Committee had done and it had a Joint ':ommittee in it. So when we met fi)r our
mark-up session, we had in our drafts a provision for a Joint Committee. But the House
had taken it out. Lyndon Johnson insisted on keeping it in there. He said. I need some-
thing to bargain with.
In the Conference Committee?
Yes. Of course, that's exactly the way it worked out. But Johnson didn't want a Joint
Committee. He didn't like to share things like that with somebody else. He wanted a
Comminee of his own. He was like a chess player. He could see several moves ahead, and
he knew that he could get what he wanted this n'ay. meaning a regular Committee of his
own, and have something for himself as well, w_ich was the National Space Counc.il.
Right after the Space Act was signed July of 1958. almost as a first amendment, there
was a requirement for annual authorization of the NASA budget. What was the back-
ground of that?
Johnson had been on the Appropriations Comrfittee. He knew how the Appropriations
Committee could cut an agenc.y up by taking n:oney away; they control the money flow.
He also knew that if you could go before the .Appropriations Committee and show that
you have really looked into these various programs, there was much more reluctance on
the part of the Appropriations Committee to cut it back. So he decided to work this out
with John _:. McCormack. the House Majority Leader and the Chai,'man of the House
Space Committee. They just said we'll make this so that all the money has to be
attthorized first, thereby giving the agency a mach better means of gening their money
-ut of the Appropriations Committee. But Mr. 1VcCormack left town on his August vaca-
tion in New England and he failed to tell the m,_mbers of his Committee of the deal that
he had made with Senator Johnson. So. it went sailing through the Senate. of course, and
when it got to the House, the people fi'om NAC '-%had spent a lot of time massaging this
issue with their fi'iends on the House side; Paul Dembling can tell you about this. They
got up and made all sorts of reasons why NASA shouldn't have to come and do this every.
year. \Veil. Johnson was furious about this bee,use he'd made a deal with McCormack
and McCormack had not passed the informatio i along to his own Committee members.
So when McCormack finally got back they settl _d it. They said we'll make this good for
one year only. but then. of course, by the next )eat it became permanent. NASA profit-
ed by that for many years.
! know there is lots more to be added, but we're out of time. We'll get back together in
a little while. Thank you vel 7 much.
Wilsmc Thank you.
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Guyford Stever
Guy Stever has been a central player in almost every issue of U.S. science and technology pol-
icy over the past four decades, so it is no surprise that in 1957 atttl 1958 he was in the middle
of discussions over how best to organize the U.S. space effort. Guy has been President of
the Carnegie Institute of Technology, Director of the National Science Foundation, and was
Science Advisor to President Gerald Ford. Since leaving government, he has been active in an
staggering variety of advisory committees. Back in 1957 and 1958, Dr. Stever, who tat the time
was an MIT facuhy member, was working with both the Air Force and the National Adt,isory
Committee for Aeronautics as those organizations tried to decide hot<., to position themselves in
the new space arena. Dr. Stever testified to both the Senate and flouse Comntittees set tap to
consider the Administration's Space Act proposal. It's an honor to have him join us today.
Logsdon:
Stever:
Logsdon:
Stever:
Logsdon:
Slever:
Logsdon:
Guy, you were closely involved at the time of Sputnik with those in the Air Force that
thought that defense requirements should receive priority in organizing the U.S. space
program. Talk a little bit about the Air Force point of view at that time.
John, as in ever T large organization there were many points of view in the Air Force.
The), were determined, of com-se, to get the necessary space programs to carry out their
important missions in defense. If these missions helped scientific exploration and other
science work, they would go along with them. But I think that the priority on the defense
paxls of the missions was important. _bu must remember that when Sputnik came along,
it was a surprise to most people in the nation, but it wasn't a surprise to many in science
and technology, aeronautics and, later+ astronautics.
It had been clear that Sputnik was coming to those in the know or paying attention.
That's right, and, in fact, there were battles, long before Sputnik, within the Department
of Defense and the Air Force, as to whether they should get involved in helping the sci-
entists send up instruments into space or to very high ahitude in the atnmsphere. So
there were lots of divisions of opinion on that. I think that at all limes the Air Force and
other services were going to defend the right to have a high priority, not necessarily the
highest, for military space. And, by the way, they have had it ever since.
Of course, there were some in the Air Force that began hatching plans for putting
humans in space, space exploration, more or less rationalized under defense require-
menls even at those early clays.
Absolutely, and the people who were vet'), anxious to stick to the surface warfare--if you
include ballistic missiles in surface warfare--they wanted to avoid getting too over-
whelmed. But, of course, space did offer some remarkable militat T capabilities in recon-
naissance and communications. Most of space is now used by the militat T.
I think that's been recognized from the ve U start. Now, at tile same time. you had this
National Advism T Committee for Aeronautics. that had been set up during World \Var I
to be the research agency for the nation's aeronautics sector, that was interested in what
it should do with respect to spac.e. ]])u were asked by General James A. Doolittle. the
Chairman of the Committee, to help think that issue through. Talk a little bit about that.
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Stever:
Logsdon:
Yes, Jimmy Doolittle, who was also Chairman ot the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board,
(I was Vice-Chairman) had been interested in space for some time and asked me, right
after Sputnik, if I would head a group making a study of what NACA had to do to become
a space agency. I told Jimmy that he had already assigned me to two major Air Force
studies, and, for a month or two, I was going to be quite busy, but then I would be glad
to do it. So he said that he would put it off. About the end of 1957 or early 1958, we
began this NACA study, which was essentially to figure out what was needed in space
in the way of science and technology, and to determine, then, what NACA did not have
and needed to become that agency.
By that time had NACA gotten some glimmer that it was going to be the core of the new
agency, or was it still one of the contenders?
Stever:
Logsdon:
Stever:
Logsdon:
Stever:
Logsdon:
Stever:
Logsdon:
Stever:
Oh, I think it was one of the contenders at that time, but many people pushed for it. It
was a civilian government agency. I think that there were some in the university world
that would have preferred something quite different than NACA to do the work.
Something like working through the National Academy of Sciences of the National
Science Foundation (NSF)?
Yes. There were lots of proposals. I think it soon began to emerge that it had to be a gov-
ernment agency, and a big government agency. If you wanted a civilian one, NACA did
have lots going for it, and a good number of the technologies.
In these deliberations both within the Air Force and NACA, was the Congress at all influ-
ential in emerging Congressional views, or was tlis really Executive branch business?
I think Congress was very active, viewed from my position at MIT as opposed to my posi-
tion at the Air Force. In Washington, the statements were flying thick and fast. It was
hard to sort it out from a distance. The power structure began to emerge, and it was soon
evident that Senator Johnson was going to have a very powerful role, which led to my
getting involved in testifying to his Committee and the House Committee.
The Administration put a bill forward and both the Senate and the House held hearings and
you testified to both of them. What kind of messa_:e were you trying to bring at that point?
Well, it was the first time rd testified to any member of the Congress who was as pow-
erful as Senator Johnson. It was quite interesting because Hugh Dryden asked me if I
would go to testify.
Hugh Dryden was then the Director of NACA.
Yes, he was Director of NACA, and testified fir'st, then I did. They ripped him apart.
Now, the reason was that the Congress was up,.et and had been ever since the end of
World War II, that NACA had dropped behind, particularly the Germans, in the devel-
opment of high-speed aircraft, supersonics, jet engines, and so on. There was a running
battle going on even before Sputnik about that. So they always liked to take NACA
representatives apart based on that. Hugh had a little bit of trouble. I was sitting there
wondering, what's going to happen to poor livle me, a professor fi'om MIT. Senator
Johnson treated me just as well as I could possibly be treated. We had a good show and
all the others did not. I spoke to Hugh afterwards. He said that was the difference
between somebody who works for the government being asked questions and somebody
who does not.
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Did you get a sense of the forces that were operating at that point? Tile Administration
had pul forward a bill setting up a civilian agenc'y. 1 don't think there was unanimous
SUl)pOll t()r that approach.
The dift_renee between something like the Atomic Energy Comnussion versus a con-
verted NACA versus some other units, people thought that they might take some of the
military units and set up a brand new agency. 1 think there was a great deal of creative,
institutional thinking, but I think NACA emerged fairly quickly.
Did you get involved in any of the (teeisions on which programs to transfer that had
been, for example, Air Force programs, to the new agency?
_,_ll, the lit'st big transfers, of course, were fi'om the Army, and that w'as the Huntsville
Redstone arsenal units with _rnher van Braun.
Well, that took a little fighting. That didn't happen until 1959.
Stever: I know, hut that was the hig transfer. By the way, van Braun was on the NACA
Commiuee.Both he and Piekering seemed a little [)it reluctant in the discussions. But,
Dr. I[)'lliam tl. Pickeritsg, director of the Jet Propulsion l,ahoratory; astrophysicist Dr. Jamt, s _t. t_n Allen, University of Iowa; and
Dr. Weraher t,on I_raun, directoc of the Army _ Redstoae launch vehicle program, anttaanced oa February 1, 1958, at the National
Academy of ,_t'i_,nct,s that they had saccess.fidly launched the first I;.S. satellite, Explorer 1. This was the signature image that
appeared in twwspapers around the nation the next morning, but this saccess also served aotict, that the nation had to codify" the
attthority for space expl_Jratiott in a single organization. (NASA photograph)
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Logsdon:
Stever:
l,ogsdon:
Stever:
Logsdon:
Stever:
Logsdon:
Stever:
Logsdon:
Stever:
Logsdon:
soon they got in the spirit of things. Pickering was then the head of the Jet Propulsion
l,aboratol 7 (JPI_).
JPI, was also an Army facility at this point.
Yes, and so out" point was that NACA was good in structures, aerodynamics, and orga-
nization, but they weren't good at electronics, and they needed a lot more in rocketry.
Those were key transfers. But, there was one other missing link. the need fiJr greater
strength in electronics. And, in fact an electronics lab was established by NASA in
1962. By then the electronics industry had be{.:un to fill in.
One Air Force program that was transferred immediately to NASA was manned space-
flight. What ultimately became the Mercury Project had its origins in Air Force plan-
ning. Is there any background there that is worth putting on the record?
Xg'bll, I think it was a natural. We couldn't have a civilian space program without manned
spaceflight and why not make that transfer. I do not recall any great arguments that cen-
tered around that: Fm quite sure there were some. but I didn't get involved with it.
You were an MIT faculty member and presumably were in conve.sations with Dr.
Killian. who was Science Advisor and President of MIT. What was his view? He, later.
was rather skeptical of the value of humans in space. Was that a view that Dr. Killian
and the scientific community had from the very start?
Some of them did; some of them didn't. I don't think he was completely against it, but I
don't think he was overwhelmed by it either. But, you know, the general populace in the
country got very enthusiastic about it. This support was recognized very quickly by
anybody who was in politics, but not necessarily in the university world.
Is there anything else you think needs to be _dded to understand, from your perspec-
tive, what went on in those creative twelve moaths or so?
No, when I look back on the whole history of my life associated in and out of govern-
ment, 1 think it was a remarkable period of taking account of these immense pressures
from so many people, positive interests and negative fears from the people.
You mean people not understanding what this all meant?
Absolutely, to convert that to an agency, I thor ght, was a great accomplishment. By the
way, there were other great accomplishments; attendant to Sputnik. People felt that
Sputnik proved the need to strengthen our wea_ education. So, it was. all in all, a source
of pride that our battling came out with a posi_ ire construction.
Thank you very much for being with us.
Stever: Thank you.
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Conversation with Paul G. Delnbling
l'm pleased to note that our next guest, Paul G. Dembling, received his law degree at the George
Washington Unit_ersity. Paul went to work for NACA in 1946, and by 1958 leas the organization's
top lawyer, its General Counsel. Once the White ttouse had decided that NACA would serve as
the core of a new space agent); Paul played a central role in drafting the legislation that the
White House sent to the Congress in April. Then he was one of the links between the
Administration and Congress in resolving differences between the Administration's Senate and
House Space Bills. Once NASA bet'ame operational, Paul joined the staff, eventually becoming
NASA General Counsel. And, later, he served as the General Counsel of the General Accounting
Office. Since leaving public service, Paul has been one of the founding partners of a major
Washington late firnt.
i
Logsdon: Thanks for joining us today, Paul. Before President Eisenhower settled on NACA as the foun-
dation for a new space agency, there was a lot of competition among various agencies for that
role. What were some of the issues and reasons that NACA was chosen?
Dembling:
Logsdon:
Dembling:
Logsdon:
Dembling:
Logsdon:
Dembling:
As some of the others have indicated, there was a lot of competition. The Air Force felt
that it should be the agency to do all space research and to be the operating space
agency. The Atomic Energy Commission felt very strongly that. if we were going to go
into space, nuclear power was going to put us there, and therefore it should be the
agency, to assume the role. NACA had done a considerable amount of space research,
as Guy Stever pointed out. He was there to assess what NACA had done, and was doing,
and what was needed to continue its role as the space agency. Soon after the Russians
had launched Sputnik there was a group of individuals in NACA that felt NACA should
be much more aggressive in either assumming the role it should be playing, or at least
to try to seek the Administration's blessing in that regard. They pressed Gen. James A.
Doolittle. who was Chairman of NACA, and Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, who was its Director.
to take a much more aggressive role. As a result of those meetings, some very strong.
Doolittle and Dryden referred to them as the young Turks in the organization. As a result
of some of those discussions, I suggested that I be given authority to draft a bill that we
could send up to the Bureau of the Budget for its consideration.
So, this was NACA trying to take the initiative.
_>s. the argument that I made to Dr. Dryden and Dr. Doolittle was to recognize that
VC'hshinglon operates on the first draft that it gets. and maybe we might seize the high gound.
Did that happen?
It did happen. I was authorized to go off in a corner and draft as much as I could of the
kind of organization that would resemble NACA, and would have the authorities neces-
saL'y for it to be the space agency.
When was this? December-January?
The first meeting with the so-called young Turks occurred in October. There was a later
meeting in December, and then I sort of went to work in January, or early February,. There
were two considerations: one was. we felt in NACA, that there was enough authority for
us to take over the space program. As Willis Shapley pointed out there was a feeling that
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Paal (.. Dembliag n,as the ge,eral counsel of the National Ad_,isory C, mmitt,'e fiJr Aeronautics (NACA) daritrg the critical
1957-1958 periled attd played a principal role in drafting the bill which ultimately became the National Aer_mautics and Space Act
of 1958. lte later sert'ed as the NASA general cot_nsel. (NASA pltotograph )
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there were enough authorities: it was just the blessing of the White House and the
Congress that was needed. However; fiom a political standpoint, we recognized thai the
populace was demanding real action. And if the real action was to set up and create a
new agency, we wanted to be the foundation on which that agency was going to be built.
't%u started interacting. ! wouhl presume, with the Bureau of the Budget. with Willis
Shapley. pretty early on in this perio(]?
We interacted early on with the people in the Bureau of the Budget and we started to
interact with the Congress because we knew that the other" agencies were trying to per-
suade the Congress that they should be the ones.
Who were you talking to in the Congress?
Well, we were talking to members of the Committee the Majority Leader. Senator Johnson,
had established. To give you a feeling about the political environment as it existed at that
time, when we tried to see Senator Styles Bridges. who was the ranking nfinority member
of that Special Committee, he didn't want to see us on the Hill. He said, he did not want
to be accused by the I)epartment of Defense of meeting with civilian agency representa-
tives. So we met on neutral grounds, which happened to be a suite in the Hotel Carhon.
This was a suite that a president of a company always took when he came to town. We
would relay out messages to him to meet with Senator Stiles Bridges and he would relay
them to the Senator.
So this was not exactly a low pressure situation?
It was not a low pressure situation, g% also recognized that others were trying to per-
suade lots of people on the Hill.
Ultimately', in the Executive Office of the White House, a decision was made, embodied
ira this March 5 memorandum, to build a new agency around the core of NACA. I guess
then you became part of the central team?
That's right.
_u were part of the team putting togethcr the legislation to put that into practice. Talk
about that period.
_11, there were five of us that worked on the legislation, using the draft that 1 had sub-
mitted. There were other aspects that had to be included. Bill Finan, who Willis Shapley
mentioned, was the coordinator of the group. Alan Dean came from the Bureau of the
Budget. Ken McClure, who was Assistant General Counsel of Commerce, was a detailee
from that organization, and Paul Johnson, who was a member of Dr. Killian's staff, came
over on loan fiom the Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics.
What was the balance between, if you wish, the new Science Advisor's operation and the
BOB in influencing the outcome?
The prime influence. I thought, was that Killian had stated that it ought to be a civilian
agency. I understood that Killian convinced President Eisenhower that that was the
route to take.
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I_ogsdon: What were the major issues that were embodied ill the Administration bill? X,Vere they
pretty much the ones that were in your original NACA-generated draft?
l)embling: All of the terms and conditions on the authorities and the tunctions that were in the orig-
inal draft pretty much remained the same.
l.t,gsdon: Presunmbly. several of those were pretty broad authorities fl, their day?
l)embling: They were the b,'oadest authorities, arm the reason they were broad was that. in my draft.
I went through all of the decisions that had been rendered by the Gene,'at Accounting
Office and the Attorney General's Office. All of those decisions spoke about the author-
tiles that agencies did have or did not have. If the decision said that. yes. you can go
ahead and do this because you have this authority. I put that into the draft. Of course,
conversely, if it said. an agency did not have that authority, because it didn't have the
words of an, or the jargon that was necessary to give it authority. I put Ihat in the draft.
So the draft that was sent over had very broad _uthority.
l,ogsdon: Once the bill got to the House and then the Senate began hearings on it. how much lob-
bying was there on the part of the Administralion? Was there an issue of the bill riot
being supported or was the question maintaining the major provisions of the
Administration approach?
Dembling: I think the major point was that the concept had to be agreed upon. I don't think that
was very difficult to agree that it shouhl be a civilian agency. Initially. if you recall.
NACA operated with the Board of Directors, vhich was called the Committee. It is a
misnomer to say it was advisory.
Logsdon: No, it was kind of a line authority.
Dembling: It had the Board of Directors. with the head of fiat being Dr. Doolittle. By the way, while
known as General Doolittle, the head of the Eighth Air Force during \Vorld War 11 and
as leader of the group that bombed Tokyo. he had an earned doctorate in science fiom
MIT So we always referred to him as Dr. Dooliltle.
LogMon: Not General Doolittle?
Dembling: No. not General Doolittle. He coordinated tt,e activities of the so-called Board of
Directors. Then Dr. Hugh L. Dryden was the operating head of the organization, the day-
by-day operations, sort of the Chief Executive ()filter or a p,esident of a company.
Logsdon: There was a set of interactions as the House and Senate suggested modifications to the
Administration Bill. How much resistance on the part of the Executive Branch was
there?
Dembling: Actually', there was little resistance to any of t} e additions or changes that were made.
There was some consideration given to nmking sure that the authorities to be included
were broad enough, primarily to assure that th,,se agencies engaged in space research
could be transferred over to NACA.
Logsdon: How about the Administ,ation? I think they had pretty strong resistance to the idea of
something like a Space Council or a top-level adviso U board, and yet, ultimately, agreed
to that. Did you get involved in that set of negotiations?
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Dembling:
Yes. Senator Johnson felt at the time, as we understood it, that there ought to be a strong
voice in the White House similar to the National Security Council. Therefore. he felt that
the Council would coordinate the work. The way he sold it to the Administration, final-
ly, was to state that the Chairman of the Space Council would be the President. and,
therefore, it was all right. You recognize that, later, when he became Vice-President the
legislation was amended to make the Vice President Chairman of the Council.
Finally, let's talk a little bit about the international dimensions of the Space Act that, in
Section 205, gave authority to the new agency to carry out international programs, and
that, apparently, caused some legal problem on the Administration's end. Can you talk
a little bit about that?
The original draft that was considered and discussed with the State Department did con-
tain a provision similar to what was finally adopted by the Congress.
But this provision didn't make it in the bill.
No, because the State Department objected. They convinced the White House that it
should not be included because foreign policy was decided by the President. It was felt
that including that provision in the bill would give NASA authority that the State
Department should have. And so, if you'll recall, when President Eisenhower signed the
bill, that became the NASA Act, he took a reservation on that provision and said that he
understood and was intetpreting it as not affecting foreign policy direction of the
President and, of course, the State Department.
Paul, over your career, you've seen a lot of legislation. How would you rate the Space
Act? It seems to have lasted very well. Why do you think that's the case?
It was done in a hurry; a lot of the policy aspects of it were done quickly. But the func-
tions and the authorities that were embodied in that piece of legislation were well
thought out and veo_ well considered. Let me just give you one example that typifies the
rest of the bill. If you'll notice, all of the functions are carried in the name of the
Administration. They are carried in the name of NASA, not in the name of an
Administrator or a Secretary, as most pieces of legislation do. Usually, if they are car-
ried in the name of an individual position, it creates delegation problems, problems of
whether an Administrator can delegate authorities to people below him. We did not have
that problem in NASA. Because all of the functions that the Congress embodied in that
Act were given to the Administration. So the Administrator could place those functions
anywhere he wanted within the organization. It gave flexibility to the Administrator that
was quite rare. Immediately after the NASA Act, the Federal Aviation Act was drafted.
It followed that model?
Yes, it was based on that model.
Thirty-four years after the fact, we look back at this period of very creative policymak-
ing, and say, that was the way to do it. Thank you very much for being with us, Paul.
Thank you.
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Conversation with Eilene Galloway
Eilene Galloway is a true pioneer in the fields of space law, policy, and organization. She joined
the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress in 1941, and worked there tireless-
ly until she formally retired in 1975. Those of as who knou t Eilene well recognize that she never
has actually stopped working day after day. She has a political science degree from Swathmore,
which, incidentally, is presenting her with an honorary doctorate later this .spring. The
Legislative Reference Service, which is now called the Congressional Research Service, provides
essential support for the .Members of Congress and for Congressional Committees. The senior
staff of that Service are world-recognized experts in their ttreas. That certainly applies to Mrs.
Galloway, whose encyclopedic knowledge of space law and policy is admired by all.
Dr. Eilene Gtdlowtty sert'ed as Senior Specialist in lnter'_ational Relations ( Ntttiotml
Ser_nrity ) fi_r the Congressional Resetzrch Sert,ice. Followinz the lttnnehing ¢_'Nlmtttik I.
she u'tts Specml Constt]t_ttt to Senator Lyndon II. Johnson o,td to Representative John I_.
MeCortmtck during congressiotml he_trings oft the "Space A,'t. '" (NASA photogrrtph )
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Thank you for joining us today, Eilene. What was the background that led to your being
so intimately involved as Congress considered space issues in 1957 and 1958?
Well, I was the National Defense Analyst. I had assignments from the House Armed
Services Committee and the Senate, but, mostly, I had been working for almost a year
for the Senate Armed Services Committee, and, in particular, for Senator Russell, who
was the Chairman. The primary interest at that time was in missiles whether or not we
had enough missiles, how good they were, and what the situation was in the Soviet
Union. And, before the Sputnik went up, I had also worked for the Committee on the
organization of the Department of Defense for the 1947 Act. I was very familiar with the
National Security Council, and with the problem caused by interservice rivalries. This
Committee was primarily concerned about the military threat when the Sputnik went up.
This is now the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee?
I had written a report called, "Guided Missiles in Foreign Countries," that was pub-
lished by both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees in the spring of 1957.
Anyone on the Hill who had worked on guided missiles was called upon immediately to
work on space.
Well, you've heard Gerry Siegel and Glen Wilson describe the work of the Preparedness
Investigating Subcommittee, which you also had direct involvement in. Is there anything
you'd like to add to their accounts of those two months of hearings?
Yes, it was really a very exciting time. The Sputnik went up on a Friday, and early Monday
morning Senator Johnson telephoned me. He said that he had talked to Senator Russell,
and Senator Russell had recommended me, because I had helped him with a hearing with
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said, "Eilene, I want to make me a record in outer space, and
I want you to help me." So I said that I would. I think my main qualification was that I was
not scared of any assignment. So I began immediately working on the problems of the
Congress because there was such turmoil there. The only other time that I remember there
being such an impact on the Hill was when the atomic bomb went off.
In 1945?
Yes, and I had also worked 1945--6 for Senator Brian McMahon, (Chairman of the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy) and had written a report on "Atomic Power; the Issues
before Congress," so I was familiar with that. It was coincidential that a number of these
threads of different assignments happened to converge at that time.
So you were the right person for the time. You uniquely worked with both the House
Committee and Senate Committee to consider the Congressional reaction to the
Administration's space proposals. Give us some of the highlights of your work, particu-
larly, first, with the House Committee and it's Chairman Majority Leader, John
McCormack. In particular, I know it was the House that suggested that NASA, which the
Administration proposed to be the National Aeronautics and Space Agency, become an
Administration. How did that change come about?
Well, Mr. McCormack first called me in to ask me whether it was a good idea for him to
become Chairman of this Committee that they were thinking of setting up. OriginaIly, it
was thought there would be only the Senate Committee because that was the way it had
been done with atomic energy. So, I urged him to do it. I said, it was very, very impor-
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rant. Then I said, this was after the bill had tome up, 1 don't like it being called an
agency because, it seems to me, that does not have very much status. We have so many
agenvies of different kinds: we should call it something more important. The whole idea
was to get this at the Presidential level and ha_e it sound like a very important organi-
zation. So he said, we've already started calling it NASA: and I said, can't we call it an
administration and have an administrator? Much to my astonishment, he pressed some-
thing on his desk, called somebody in, and said, change the bill: st,'ike out "agency" and
"'director" and write in "administ,ation" and "administrator."
Logsdon: That's how legislation gets written, I guess.
Galloway: Yes. Then I helped him get Charles Sheldon on the staff, who was an expert in trans-
portation.
l,ogsdon: '_:as he with the Library of Congress?
Galloway: Yes. Sheldon was a senior specialist in transportation. McCormack asked me to write a
report on the task of the Congress in formulating legislation for space. He opened the
hearings with this ,eport. It was at a time when a number of people thought that we could
erase "atomic energy." and write in "outer space," and pass an identical bill.
Logsdon: Just use the same approach?
Galloway: This was impossible since atomic energy was a source of energy and space was like a
new geographic area that we were going to pioneer. I should add that the Preparedness
Subcommittee, on the 21st of November, which was a few days before the hearings start-
ed on the 25th, received a report from the Rocket and Satellite Panel, which was chaired
by James Van Allen. It had been working on this for about ten years. This report had
gone to Eisenhower on October 14th. It was all .lbout setting up a civilian agency pro-
tecting the Department of Defense and everything it had to do in a militmy way, but
pointing out how many benefits there were to space, especially communications, mete-
orology, and navigation. We could not do all those things under the law in the
Department of Defense. We had to set up a civilian agency.
l,ogsdon: So, it had to be a civilian agency.
Galloway: In Janual% Van Allen got together with George Sutton, who was Chairman of the
American Rocket Society, and they produced a report which has so many words in it that
are similar to the words that are in the Act, like "leadership," "pre-eminence," and sep-
arating from the military.
Logsdon: There are a lot of themes that have been there fi'om the very start.
Galloway: Yes, and they were already there at this time.
Logsdon: What were the highlights of your work, then, with the Senate Committee? What led to
the creation of what became the National Aeronautics and Space Council rather than the
advisory board the Administration had proposed?
Galloway: \Veil, the House started its hearings first. I had been going to the hearings in April of
1958 for a number of days. I had the transcript of the hearings, and had prepared ques-
timls fi_r McCormack to ask Dryden and General Doolittle. So, I had the bill, analyzing
it. and came to the ctmclusion that a seventeen..man advisory board internal only to
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NASA,meetingonlyIbmtimesa year,waspaidonlyforperdienlandtravel,wasnot
thekindoforganizationthatwouldhaveany(:loutatall overotheragencies.Tile),were
supposedtocooperatewithotheragencies.Thiswasn'tjustNASAandDOD:thiswas
NASAandothercivilianagencieslike Commerce,State.andwhatnot.The)'hadnot
mentionedStateDepartmenta all in thehearings.So,the),did nothavemuchideaof
theroleof theStateDepartment.althoughthiswasave,yinte,nationalsubject.1was
familiarwiththe rivahy between the services and with the fact that we had to have the
National Security Council. Now, l)ryden had gotten along so well and fl)l so many years
with the l)eparln_ent _f l)efense, that the very idea that they could ever have any kind
of dispute, or any trouble of any kind, was just unthinkalAe to him. He just couldn't
imagine it, and was surprised that the question was asked. ! had to write this report for
Senator Johnson. because Johnson wanted to know how he could improve the bill.
Before the Senate hearing sial'ted, l had written at)out the Advisory Board and various
other things. I was very concerned over whether the agency ,,','as going to be research and
development, and also operations, or whether it was not. This was very vague. The word-
ing was quite ambiguous. NASA could have been research and development and oper-
ations, but there was a mind-set that came over fiom the NACA. It was like a shadow ill
the future, not just because of the words in the law, because we could have amended it
if we just thought the), were ambiguous. Ahhough. when Cyrus Vance asked the ques-
tion ill the hearing+ he was told that NASA was an operating agency. This caused trou-
ble all along the line.
So, you were able to convince Senator Johnson that there needed to be some top-level
policy coordinating board that had authority over the total national space program?
The whole point was that we needed a total United States space program: milital y and
civilian. This wasn't something that we wanted fragmented. We could see that there were
lots of parts, and the whole idea was to identify the problem as one of coordination. This
cannot be done with an internal board,
Clearly, Senator Johnson took your advice to heart, and was very serious about the role
of the Space Council. He insisted on it in the bill. and I guess, eventually, was able to
convince President Eisenhower to accept it. Did you get involved in those discussions?
Or was that mainly at Senator Johnson's or the Presidential level?
I think that was at the Presidential level. My conferences were with Johnson, personally,
in dealing with this. Now, this idea could not have taken root in the House, although I
was talking to McCormack, who had changed the name of the agency. I had no clout with
McCorrnack with regard to the Space Council. The reason that there was such fertile soil
for it in the Senate was because of their interest in national defense. They all knew about
interservice rivahy. You did not have to explain it very much: they knew that right away.
especially Senator Symington.
If space was going to be important, it needed this kind of cooMination.
Now. I must say I called it a Board, because it had been (:ailed a BoaM in the bill that
came over: it was changed to Council in the Conference Report.
What were some of the major issues in bringing the House and Senate Cmnmittee bills
and views together? That ;,,'as one of them, 1 suppose. There was also the (luestion of this
joint Congressional Conlmittee versus separate Conmlittees.
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Galloway: $_s.welli ,,,,'asaskedtowriteareportonhowtile Congress should be organized. I had
four options. They were options that I discussed, aecoMing to the Congressional
Research Service style, in pro and con fashion. _)ne of them was to turn it all over to the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Another was to set up a Joint Committee on Space
mr distribute bills when they came to the Senate and had to be referred to the
Committees that were already in existence. This was a subject of interest to Foreign
Aft'airs. Foreign Relations. Commerce. and Agricuhure.
Logsdon: What about Armed Services'."
Galloway: All of them. The other option was to set up separate Stan(ling Committees. As Glen
Wilson has explained, they finally set up separate Standing Committees.
Logsdon: Well, ! know Lots can be said on the following question. We may not have time to finish
all we have to say on the international events in the Space Act. I think that was an area,
clearly, where Congress took the lead, pointing out the need for space to be truly interna-
tional anti that was written into the Space Act in Section 205. Talk about some of the
background of getting that included.
Galloway: When the bill came over. the Declaration of Polic_, and Purpose said that the United States
should cooperate with nations and groups of nations. And it was apparent that this was an
international subject. Right away we needed international tracking stations: satellites went
around the globe in ninety minutes or less and over national boundm 7 lines. We had some
kind of a relationship with the Soviet Union and were going to have a relationship with the
I_!nited Nations. There was the role of the State De I_artment, because space technology was
a wonderful tool in many ways to use in the conduct of U.S. foreign relations. So. it was
clearly international. However. this point was tmught out by a number of people in the
House and in the Senate who worried abot,t it. I worked with Senator Symington on this.
The people in the Executive Branch did not want to have anything more in the bill. _ did
not have a Section 205, and the Senate. particularly, wanted to put in Section 205. So. we
had a meeting of the Senators. all sitting around a table, and the staff was sitting on the
side. It had been written down to a certain point. _l_ell, Senator Green was Chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. and he was apparently asleep. He looked to me to
be sound asleep. All of a sudden, just as we were a!)out to agree on the wording, just before
the end. he woke up and said, by and with the _dvice and consent of the Senate. That
wouht apply to all internati¢mal cooperation. Well, I was absolutely stunned and very, very
upset, because 1 knew that NASA could not have a program of international cooperation
if evetTthing had to come to the Senate. So. I spoke to Senator Johnson about this. and he
said it was all right for me to tell Herberl Reis. w!lo was in the Office of l+egal Affairs in
the State l)epartment, of my concern. 1 think it must have been Herberl Reis who wrote
the statement by President Eisenhower. who said hat this section does not preclude less
formal arrangements. Just a few years later. Senato¢ Symington and Margaret Chase Smith
got very excited because they thought NASA was doing more than it should. So I had to
get out a Senate document in which I reviewed all kinds of international agreements NASA
had. and wrote an introduction on the differences between memoranda of understanding.
agency to agency agreements. Executive agreemelfls, and treaties. When you go through
it. you can see that there are a lot of things that you can do internationally that do not
require an Executive agreement or a treaty.
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Sure.Maybeat theendwewill spendacoupleof minutes on the speech that Senator
Johnson gave before the United Nations in November of 1958. in which he highlighted
the U.S. position on the need for international cooperation in space. I know v¢)u were
involved in that.
Oh, that was very exciting. Glen Wilson and I were in San Francisc¢_ attending a space
medicine conference.
\_,%s it in San Francisco or San Antonio?
Oh yes. San Antonio. Texas. President Eisenhower asked l#ndon J_hns.n to go to the
United Nations and make a speech which showed that the Executive and 1,egislative
b,'anches were unified in promoting space for peaceful purposes, h_r the benefit .f
mankind. So, Senator Johnson with a bevy of people came to San Antonio and t.ok us
out to the ranch. We began working on this speech with some other people: ttorace
Busby, 1 think, was involved. The rest of us added things and Eisenhower sent down the
plane. We flew to New York, where we were met by Henry Cabot Lodge. who was the
U.N. Ambassador at that time. We had nineteen other countries lined up. Johnson made
this speech in which he said outer space is unscarred by conflict, it must remain peace-
ful. It must be an arena for peace. It was really an exciting moment because this led the
United Nations to adopt the ad hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
Within a year, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Poland had decided to go in with
us. _ had decided by' that time to make all the decisions by consensus instead of vot-
ing. So, the full Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was established and has
two Subcommittees, Scientific and Technical and Legal. (The Legal is meeting right now
in Geneva.) It began with twenty-four members and now has fifty-three. So, the House
was also interested. I should say that I had discussed with McCormack a resolution on
international cooperation in space, especially with the United Nations. This passed both
the House and the Senate in a concurrent resolution.
Eilene we've run out of time. There's so much more we could say. You've made remark-
able contributions to the world's space activities, and particularly in the period we've
discussed today. Thank you very much.
Oh. thank you.
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We have brought all seven of today's participants together for this final part of our work-
shop with the idea of filling in any gaps that haven't come out in the conversation so far,
checking one another's points of view, because there have been some discrepancies
along the way, and, in general adding to the record that we're trying to create. My job is
to steer this conversation but, hopefully, a very minimal amount. One area that nobody
has mentioned, just to put it on the table, is the impact that some have claimed of
President Eisenhower's concern about the ability of reconnaissance satellites to perform
overflight and do it without claims of national sovereignty. Did that get into the deliber-
ations of a civilian space agency at all? Or are the historians like Walter McDougall that
have made such a point of that missing the point? Do any of you in remembering those
discussions view that as an issue at the time?
It was not an issue at the time, only because there had been some reconnaissance flights.
I must remind the group that NACA was the front for the U-2 operation that the Central
Intelligence Agency ran, Ostensibly it was a project which sought meteorological data,
but actually was U-2 flights that went over Russia. You recall, later, Gary Powers was
shot down.
Indeed.
President Eisenhower had to make the explanation.
That was a couple of years later?
That was a couple of )'ears latel; but it was on everyone's mind. You recognize that Dr.
Dryden, who was the Director of NACA, became Deputy Administrator for NASA and
was fully aware of that program. One of the first things he did with the first Administrator
was to brief him on that issue,
Did this concern, not about military uses, but national security uses of space, enter into
the Congressional debate at all?
It entered into many of the conversations. I think that it was fairly' well realized that this
could be aterrific reconnaissance instrument. I think that it didn't enter into our dis-
cussions because wbat could we do about it? You knmv it was up there. Nobody really
seriously thought about ruing to build some sort of missile to shoot them down. The only
way it could have entered into the discussions was whether this possibility might mean
it should be under wraps, but even that was silly, really'.
Eilene, did this issue of satellite overflight get mentioned anywhere in the discussions
of what to bring before the United Nations?
I think later on it did. In the early' months, I don't recall it coming up in that cotmection.
The reason it came up was because of the issue of sovereignty. Planes were operating in
sovereign air space. It was legal for the Soviet Union to shoot down the I_!-2. That _'as
one of the reasons why they didn't want to have any sovereignly in outer space. They
didn't know where air space ended an(] outer space began. Nevertheless. they, knew thai
anything that was in orbit was in outer space. Since these satellites went around in
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lI'ith the p¢tssttge of the ,'_'ationM Aeron,uties _tml Space _4ct q/" 1958. and NASA'. _.st,hlishmt.m on October 1. 1958. Prt'sident
Eist.nhower tqqJointt.d 7: Keith Glt'nrusn (right) tts ttdministrator and llugh L. Dryden (L°ft) t_s deputy administrtlt_m t3.ASA pho-
togzrttph 514-_4I)_11._'- I )
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ninety minutes or less they just automatically wet,t over national t)ounda U lines. They
couldn't do anything about that.
No, nt_t at this early point.
Later on it came up in the U.N. hecause of the clarity of the pictures that wouht be taken.
Yes, lint that was many years later.
There was some discussion by the public that I think should be noted here. 1 think one
of the things that bothered a lot of people was the thought that somebody up there with
a pair of field glasses couhl be looking down at them and reading their mail. At one point
there was an extreme right wing conservative pus}. Somehow they got the idea that we
were going to wind up with a great big treaty; lite the Antarctic Treaty, and thai we
would give part of outer st)ace and part of the nl()Oll tO the Russians. It was mltty sort of
stuff, but, nevertheless, it was there.
There was the Eisenhower proposal tor Open Skie.,..
Which was 1955, I believe.
Right. But there was no l)asible way to (1o that in 1957 or 1958. Even the development
of reconnaissance satellites did not really take place until the sixties. By that time, the
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problemwasaboutwhereaerospaceended.Therewasalotof air law about whether you
could fly and where you couldn't, and where outer space began was fuzzy. That is why
every place in the Space Act you'll see the term aeronautical and space.
Right.
They're paired together because we didn't know how to define the differences. It was
also recognized that there was no consent sought to launch any satellite. And none was
given. That was the policy that was followed in the United Nations.
This is a beautiful example of how reality determines what the law is going to be. [ mean
the satellites went up; they circled the Earth; they crossed all of the boundaries of var-
ious countries. Just de facto overflight in space became okay.
There are still some problems, for example there are limits to how much nuclear mate-
rial you can put in space. That's because people don't want a lot of crashes with nuclear
material being released.
Also, John, on the Administration_ side, we did a good deal, purposely, to help fuzz the
whole idea of where outer space began. We had a big campaign against the French when
they argued for eighty kilometers for the boundary. This was a policy idea that we got all
the other countries to gang up against. We and them could not afford to be bound by a
definition there, because as Glen said, it would not work. The first weather satellites
showed the world for the first time that you could really see things from space. It was a
great coup and a great thing for the world because the Russians did not object, This was
the crucial time when the Russians first accepted the fact, (and other countries would
also know) that the U.S. could look at the Russians and vice versa. This was what real-
ly set up the possibility of stabilization of the nuclear arms race in later years.
What Eisenhower wanted was Open Skies.
Let me try a very different set of questions. Listening to all of you talk as you have this
afternoon, it's clear that you have slightly different perceptions of Senator Johnson's atti-
tudes, beliefs, and ideas at this time. George, you've said that he had to be convinced of
the importance of space beyond its direct military significance.
Right.
i think that others have suggested that he saw the importance of space almost from the very
start. So, maybe we can put in a little more texture on what Senator Johnson's ideas were.
Let me make one point about Senator Johnson that I think is important in trying to deter-
mine his attitude. And that is you were never quite sure what he was thinking. Gerry and
I had this experience a number of times. }'bu give him a memo and he would almost
immediately come out against it. Now, I'm not sure, in my own mind. that he was really
against it, What he was trying to do was see if he could not get something else out of you.
In this particular case, I'm reasonably convinced, that he was just thinking at the time
of the military importance of it. You know, we were down on the ranch, pretty well iso-
lated. The Austin American Statesman did not ca,'ry the same kind of analyses of what
had happened that we might get out of the New York Times or the New York Herald
Tribune. I think that he may have started out not so much opposed, but with a feeling
that this was nonsense: let's get on down to these rockets.
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Wilson: Well,l'll makethecomment,however,thatduringthosehearings,boththePreparedness
Hearingsandthenlateronthebill, eveU single thing that we know today about the
space program came out as a possibility. 1 mean, you know, the weather satellites, the
earth observing satellites, the missions to the planets, evetT single thing that we've seen
happen in the last thirty-four years in space was talked about, mentioned, and under-
stood at that time. Communications satellites, eveubody knew that that was going to be
the first real usefulness of these objects.
Stever: These ideas were known by many scientists, engineers, and military officers, for six-
eight years before Sputnik. Sputnik just opened the bottle for all of the ideas to fly out.
Galloway: Well, my understanding was that Senator Johnson was driving this effort. He was doing
a lot of other things at the same time: he was working with some people on civil rights.
So, it depends on who he was contacting at the time.
Logsdon: One thing you said in your remarks, George, and that has been widely written on in var-
ious histories of this period is that LBJ saw space as an issue that could make him
President. You go on to say, I think, that he did not make it overtly a partisan issue. I
have a two-part question. Did the Eisenhower Administration see this as a political
bombshell that would threaten Republican hold on the White House, and dealt with the
Democratic Congress in a partisan way, or vice versa? I mean, what were the partisan
elements at this point?
Reedy: I did not have a feeling, very frankly, that the Adtrlinistration was being overly partisan
about this in a Democratic versus Republican sen.,,e. My feeling was that there was par-
tisanship, in a sense, in that the Administration wa_ thinking in terms of weaponry, of the
military., program, and the various things that migl't flow. There was partisanship on the
other side of outer space exploration. You have to be very careful as to what constitutes
partisanship under the American system. Too many people analyze our political parties
as though they were European political parties. And they aren't. Our political parties are,
basically, coalitions. And their basic function, in our society, is to reduce the number of
candidates so we can get it down to two. 1 know some Republicans that are much more
liberal than any Democrat I can name. In fact, I sometimes think the only real difference
between the Republican and the Democratic Party is Democrats have trouble with left-
wing crackpots and the Republican Patty has trout le with right-wing crackpots.
Logsdon: Well. in addition to being a person of substance and a concern about the well-being of
the country. Lyndon Johnson was a politician, an ambitious politician who would like to
have been President.
Stever: One of you mentioned the fact that just after" Sputnik went up. there were powerful lead-
ers both in the Congress and in the Administration even in the Department of Defense.
who poo-pooed the importance of this. In fact. the Department of Defense had made a
conscious decision in 1956 not to support a big sat,'llite program. Instead, they set up a
very small one in Vanguard. That was well before St,utnik. There was a brief period after
Sputnik when many of the leaders of this country were saying it was not very important. 3
And then the la,'ger one. Sputnik 2 went up. It was a weapon-sized device. Then. the
whole country knew. their leaders, too. that it was _.omething to be deah with.
::l. Editorial N_te: See the c_mmlents in Wils_m. "qlow the U.S. Space Act Canto Tu Be." third paragraph, fiJr nmre inflJrma-
lion on thi., _.ulwct.
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Yeah. I think it is often missed that Sputnik 2 was almost, or perhaps more. traumatic
than Sputnik I because of the sheer size of it.
I think Sputnik 1 was a phenomenon: you could go see it in your back yard.
\_:ell, Sherman Adams sure was poo-pnoing it. He was the one that made the remark
about Lyndon Johnson playing outer space basketball.
It must be also noted that NACA was spending something like twenty-five percent of its
budget on space research at the time that Spuhaik ',vent ul). And yet, it was aft'aid to
come out publicly and say that because of the criticism it might have on the Hill. One
of the reasons that Guy Stever was appoinled tt_ head the Committee. was because his
presence as the Chairman would lend a lot of credibility to that Committee. and. having
the background that he had, they said, let Guy Stever take a look at what NASA/NACA
was doing, and what shouht it do ira order to can 7 forward.
l_et me add one other thing that 1 think should I>e on the record here. l am not at all sure
that, at that particular point, l,yndon Johnson was interested in the Presidency. 1 think
that lie certainly was at earlier tin|es and he certainly was later. But. for all kinds of per-
sonal reasons, he'd reached one of those points where he began to say. is this whole thing
worth it'¢ He was actually, at that point, talking to many close friends about retiring.
going into private life. I think he meant it. I think he got over it, thank God. But I think
he meant it.
1 think that one of the main features of this particular time was that there was harmony
between the Executive branch and the Congress. The emphasis on natiunal defense was
so strong that it was holding evel)'body together. People say that when you have a
Republican President and Democratic Congress the two can't get together: this is a good
example of one time in which they did.
The issue was of such national importance it certainly transcended some elements of polities.
When Johnson got to the United Nations, he gave a speech in which he said the
President is a Republican and I'm a member of the Democratic Patty: these are dis-
tint:lions, but they are not differences; we have unity.
That goes back to the point that I made earlier about the nature of our parties. Some
regard our government as being parliamentary, which it is not. In the early part of the
Eisenhower Administratiota, Eisenhower_ prol)lems were not with the Demoerals. \Ve
were constantly upholding him against the Republicans.
The Taft wing of the Rept,hliean Party was a very strong isolationist wing. Willis, you
look like you want to say something.
Shapley: 1 just endorse what the others are saying fi'om the standpoint of us in the Executive
branch and in the Executive Office. I never heard the whole thing referred to one bit as
a partisan thing. I was not surprised, because during that whole period after the very tirst
couple of years of the Eisenhower Administration the whole atmosphere was not really
one of confl'ontation. You eouhl work not only with I_yndon Johnson. but with George
Mahon. The power structure in the House and in the Senate was such that there was
basically an accomnmdation.
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l,ogsdon: They had a national perspective.
Slevel': There was another argument, though, going on ab_mt military missiles. 'tou remenlber in
the electi<m ill 1960, the Missile (',ap was a major issue. It wasn't Space Gap, it was
those ballistic missiles.
l,ogsdon: Because that was mm'e clearly threatening?
Wilson: Let me just point out that when Sputnik went up, the very next day we talked about the
fact that l,yndon Johnson made calls that very e_ening to Russell and others. The very
next clay. Senator Syminghm sent a telegram to Russell demanding that they have a full
meeting of the A,'med Services Committee on this. By Monday morning, which was only
three days after the Sputnik launch, they were able to tell Symington that the matter had
ah'eady been taken care of. Lyndon Johnson and Senator Russell decided that
Symington would be too partisan in this.
l,ogsdon: Too s hri I17
\Vilson: That is correct. That backs up the point you just made here: that there was this feeling that
in the hands of l,yndnn Johnson, it wouhl be handle.d in a less partisan way. It would open
up the opportunity to put the facts on the table with,)ut a lot of"Who Struck John?" stuff.
Reedy: You know, those decisions were made in full ::ooperation with Styles Bridges, the
Chairman of the Relmtdican Senate Caucus.
Siegel: In the face of this rather unlalkative group. I want to say prefatorily, that my friends will
never believe this if they happened to see this tape, because I have a reputation for
never letting anymle finish a sentence. I sat here. +'rod did not interrupt, once. I just want
that noted for tile permanent record. Now, 1 woul I like to say something general about
the question of Johnson's role in the early stages of the space program. I think you can-
not understand it if you do not understand his unic ue system of leade,'ship ira the Senate.
He never introduced a bill that became a major vehicle for passage in any important
issue, tte would have somebody else introduce the bill. He would lead the Committee
through its processes, to the extent sometimes o: having to get the bill reported from
(committee because the Chairman couldn't quite negotiate it. But he would do this not
out in flont: he was interested in results. He kl_ew that if he tried to dominate that
Senate. in thai fashion, he wouhl never be able t_ [)ass civil rights legislation, banking
legislation, heahh legislation, and space legislation. And all of the time that we're look-
ing f¢)r these gaps of activity in Johnson's role. the, were very deliberate examples of his
style of leadership. I've ha(t to say this to so many >fmy friends who said. how could you
work fi)r this man. He never passed anything: he never introduced a bill on any subject.
Dembling: \'/,'ell. that also speaks to the fact that it was a smiiority process at the time. which you
really &,n't have now. And. once you lost that. yot didn't know who really spoke for the
Senate. ()f course, a very strong Majority l.eader certainly spoke fl_r the Senate. but you
knew the,'e were several key figures in the Senate you could go to talk to and know how
the Senate was going to operate.
Reedy: \Vhen I was on tile Policy Committee. quite often I',:1pay a courtesy call on the Chairman
of the Committee, and then I'd go down and talk tc the fourth or fifth man. who was run-
ning it. But there's one other point I want to make here: the nature of American politics
and gmevnment is that of a constantly shifting series of alliances and partisanships. An
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allianceis formed on an issue. Then the issue changes and, all of a sudden, the people
who were in the first alliance scatter, and new alliances are formed. The Johnson genius
consisted in knowing what he could put together on any particular issue which might
reach clear across the aisle. He even used Joe McCathy a couple of times when he was
opposed to Eisenhower by saying to Joe. would you really like to stick it to Eisenhower?
I'll never forget that one.
When he became Vice-President and was appointed the head of the Space Council,
didn't he get into ave D, unnatural environment?
Yes, that amendment was his.
Something has to be said about that. and maybe this is the time to say' it. When he
became Vice President. he insisted that the Space Council be under his Chairmanship.
He convinced Kennedy. I remember that President Kennedy then called Jim Webb, who
was the Administrator of NASA at the time, and for whom 1 was working. I got the
assignment to get a piece of legislation drafted and carried over to the Hill. However.
Jim Webb and President Kennedy were concerned about whether Vice President
Johnson was going to run the space program. So, Jim Webb and President Kennedy came
up with the idea that. okay, we'll send the piece of legislation over; we'll make the Vice
President Chairman of the Space Council: but, the President will control the agenda of
the Space Council. In that fashion, you can control whether the Vice President, or the
Chairman of the Space Council, becomes the head of the space program. And, of course.
you see what happened: after a while, the Space Cot, ncil really did not function com-
pletely and really was repealed. When President Bush named Vice President Quayle to
head a Space Council, he had to create an administrative Space Council.
In my own research of this period, 1 note that Johnson took his al_proach to that ,ole of
Vice President of the Space Council in the ve U early months of 1961. Kennedy asked
him to put together the basis for what became the Apollo decision. What Johnson did
was to go to the Hill. consuh with Styles Bridges, consult with senior 1)emocrats and
Republicans in the House, and Senator Kern who had taken over the Chairmanship of
the Space Committee, and could go back to the President and say, if you propose this,
it will be supported in both houses on a non-partisan [msis.
You may be certain that President Kennedy would never have made that proposal if he
didn't know that the slides were greased. I mean. he knew it was going to go.
I ask the question again: the slides were greased, but didn't the grease get the Vice
President into a lower role than he might have played? Wasn't it a downhill greasing
for him?
I don't think so. You know, one of the problems was Johnson was not a good administrator.
In fact Johnson and administrator is an oxymoron. I think in order to run something like
the Space Council+ you were not administering anything, but you had to know something
about administration.
The Executive branch is not the Congress.
Right. I think that he was a superb President despite the fact that he got in all that trou-
ble with Vietnam, which he was against, but that's another story. The thing is that when
it came to actual management of something, he would step in and manage something
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thai was out of his t)ersonal fi:)rtune. Thank God I ady Bird wouht sit back and when he'd
lost interest in it. she would step in and put it lmck together again.
Logsdon: Let me try a totally counter-factual kind of quest on fi)r you to think about: what if there
had [)evll no Sputnik to energize Lyndon Johnson, down on the ,'anch. to rapid action.
As several of you have said. there was a space progranl born in the United States before
Sputnik. and it clearly would have continued in some form. What difference did the gal-
vanizing effect of Sputnik and the involvement of Lyndon Johnson make. do you think,
long-term, in what the countly has done in space'?
Siegel: Crucial, at that time. \¥e would have had to wait Ior that launching, I think. How fast do
you think the program would have gone?
Stever: \X'ell. you know, I've always felt that. as far as ,ur leade,ship in space is concerned.
had?he Deparlment of l)efense decided that we should put up the first satellite, we could
have done that. However. if we had launched a satellite, we would not have as big a
space program today, simply because, when Sputnik came along, everybody would have
said, why get excited'?
Wilson: \Veil, at the time, fiom when the IGY began on July 1st, 1957, to its end of 1958, ira my
opinion we might not have even made our comnlitment to get a satellite by the end of
the I(,Y. _ou saw hmv much trouble they had getting the Vanguard up ira the first place.
Siegel: The question we really have to ask you, (,uy, is, would we have launched, anti when, a
large satellite that would have produced this perspective.
Stever: ()It. much, much later. ! think that Sputnik galva:lized the people in this country in all
of the actix ilies and a leader in the Congress had to emerge. And Johnson emerged.
Siegel: He was ready.
Stever: Leaders in science, technolog% and industry, all em u'ged at this time. They were all ready.
l,ogsdon: The eountl T perceived Sputnik as a crisis, and tire best ira the countr)' responded to it
with a ,ather creative and lasting approach.
Reedy: 1 think I should add one thing that's been in the back of my mind: a little uneasiness
about maybe we went too fast. I know that is not loo popular a view. But. nevertheless,
would we really have lost anything if the program lind proceeded along the orde.'ly lines
of scientific research? Obviously, if the Russians put one up. we had to, too. l'm not
arguing that at all. I'm assuming that, if it hadn't leen fl_r Sputnik, they wouht not have
been airy ft, rther ahead than we were. \rt/e had a mi:.sile progranr that was proceeding just
as well as theirs, really. ! looked at some of the slatistics and. you know+ it is true that
figures do not lie. Lies can figure. But. I sometimes have a feeling that it went a little too
fast. Within a few years, we were looking for" exct>es. FII never fi)rget the fall-out thing
where we knew we got q_t|on fD'ing paras out of th _space program.
l)eml)ling: John made a point earlier ira talking with somebod :: Ire said, did this not only galvanize
the American thinking, but was it also an indication of failure? I think had the Russians,
fl_r example, pushed their program and landed on the Moon before we did. this would
have ee,'tainly had a tremendous demoralizing effect on the American people.
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Well, I agree to that because we would have had two failures in a row. but, you see, the
question was not the Moon, the question was what would have happened if Sputnik had
not gone up.
Eilene has been patient.
This was a vm.'y dramatic incident, this Sputnik, that was a catalyst for every element
that we needed to have a space program. We had the scientists and engineers who knew
what to do about it. We had the resources. We had an aviation industry that could expand
into making space vehicles. R_ had leadership in the Congress. We had the President
and the Majority Leader of the Senate in harmony on what we wanted. We did not have
a lot of partisanship. And we found all the benefits that could come fi'om space that
could not be done under the law of the Department of Defense. And I think that we
would have gone faster. I think that more than some of the others do, because some of
the people who were on Van Allen's panel were interested in communications. You see,
by 1962, we had the COMSAT act. We had worldwide communications, and the space
communications itself was the best benefit that we could have had.
Willis?
John, I would like to roll the tape back a little bit to the conditions in which Sputnik gal-
vanized everything else. There had been one step somewhat similar before that. In the
mid-fifties, there were various reports that warned how we were falling behind the
Russians in missiles. We were scared first about missiles. The conservative
Administration was not about to be stampeded by some big military threat: but, the pres-
sure of the Rockefeller and Gaither reports was there. In late 1956. I believe,
Eisenhower made the decision to go all out in the ballistic missile area. This had gone
from being a dream to a feasible thing because the nuclear scientists had gotten the size
of the warheads down so that a reasonable size missile could be an intercontinental mis-
sile. So we had already gone through one period of reaction to a Soviet threat, and, while
this did not catch the whole of public attention the way Sputnik did, it had been recog-
nized by the attentive public, the people that were concerned knew about it. The coun-
tU had then seen the large, by those days' standards, amounts of money that were
pumped rapidly into all the ballistic missile projects: Atlas, Titan. Thor. and Jupiter.
(They were even going to launch a liquid fueled Jupiter fiom submarines, which would
have been one of the hairiest operations ever. Fortunately, that one was changed to the
safer solid fueled Polaris program.) So there was, especially within the Defense bureau-
craey and the Eisenhower Administration, a precedent when Sputnik came along. They
did have a template to follow.
Except the congressional reaction to Sputnik, because it was a public event and, I think,
the public reaction was perhaps stronger than it had been to other problems.
Absolutely.
The dynamics were very different. I think.
The congressional and public reaction was much greater. If you're trying to assay what
might have been, it would be interesting to speculate what would have happened if the
Eisenhower Administration had gone ahead and pushed more than it did.
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Reedy: Some awful needles were stuck into this thing, though. I call still remember the hearing,
where we left with a distinct impression that the Soviets outnumbered us in terms of mis-
siles hy all average of about, l think, twelve or fifteen to one. l have forgotten the exact
figures. We were giving them credit for having, maybe, fifteen hundred missiles and we
were only supposed to have about thirty. It turned out later, after Kennedy took over the
Presidency, that we got another look at those figures. The figures had been based on the
assumption that the Soviets were manufacturi,:g every missile they possibly could,
which they were not.
Siegel: You know what we need? We need an economic Sputnik to be launched by China to sort
of joh us into getting rid of our present problems
Stever: I think it has already been launched by Japan.
Logsdon: Well. we are getting near the end of our time. Let me turn to each of you and say. if you
have another minute or so. is there any one thing you want to make sure that gets on the
record that we have not covered today? It's been remarkably interesting and productive.
What have we missed?
Logsdon: Geru?
Siegel: l make this flat statement: thal, if it were not for Lyndon Johnson. there would not have
been a Space Act in 1958. Now, that's not to say it would not have come out in 1959 or
1960. But, with all of the impetus, with all of the fear and concern and with the drives
that Sputnik created, it took this man's parliamm_taz 7 genius to move it so rapidly. He
really did move it. not just in the Senate, but in t}:e House.
Wilson: I would like to add to what Gerry said. It was important that not only was l,yndon
Johnson the leader in the Preparedness Subcommittee hearings, and then the Space
Committee hearings, but the fact that he was the _ajority Leader of the Senate gave him
a lot more leverage to get that stuff through and more capability when he was dealing
with the House.
Siegel: But, Glen l want to say this to my Democratic friends today: he was never tile Majority
Leader. Was he, George? He was the Democratic leader. 4
Reedy: There is one point I want to make, and it's on top ,,f what Gell T had to say. I agree with
him. I just want to take it one step further. 1 think that, without Johnson, the launching
of Sputnik could ve U well have led to an increase t missile program. I think what real-
ly happened here is thai Johnson pushed it into the area of outer space exploration. And
thank God.
Siegel: That may not be fair to the Administration. I have discovered just in preparing for these
sessions today, that there was, as Guy Stever has t,ointed out, a great deal of rea(tiness
in the Executive Branch to develop some kind of sroace program.
4. Editur's Note: Technicalh'. this was true. LBJ had used as his .fficial title when the Dem.crats were in the min.ritv in the
Senate. "'Democratic l*_ader.""rather than "'Minority Leader." When the Denmcracts ret,.,k the majority. Johns.n c,mtinued t.
be referred tu as the "'Dem,cratic Leader" rather than "'Majurity laeader."
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It is a little (langerous for people in a vet T important segment of our society, like the
Legislative branch of our government to underestimate the inevitability of advances in
science and technology. When you had ballistic missiles, a satellite was inevitable.
Someone was going to do it. I was on a Committee set up by Vannevar Bush in 1948, and
we were looking at the time when intercontinental ballistic missiles would be operable.
r_e said 1960. We hit it pretty close as far as operations were concerned. But, at that
meeting in 19,18, two of out members were aheady very anxious for us to include the
possibility of satellites. The rest of the members were too. But there is an inevitability
about it. 1 agree with you when you said that we would not have had a Space Act as fast
without Johnson. He really did coalesce everything. On the other hand, the inevitabili-
ty of that pressure was there.
Maybe the thing to say in closing, though, is that leadership is taking inevitability and
making something creative out of it.
Absolutely.
Certainly the Congress and l,.vndon Johnson in 1958 did that.
_)s, I agree with that.;
The people that will see this tape or read our proceedings in the future, I think, really
have a rare privilege. _,_ have heard from the people that were there in 1957 and 1958
as this ve U creative peri(,d in American policy unfolded. It has really [)een a privilege
for me to sit with you all today. Thank you ve_7 much.
•5, Dr. Stever subsequently added: "qn retrc_spect, many c.mmunities have made great advanc+os in space: the research sci-
enti.,,ts: the military: the induslrialists: tile explorers: the media: the educators: the +,qudents: tile pul+lit:. As we saitl, it was
inevitable."
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HOW THE U.S. SPACE ACT CAME TO BE
by Glen P. Wilson
he launching of Sputnik 1 by the Soviets on October 4, 1957. created a near panic in Washington.
After all, tile U.S. had announced on July 29, 1955, tllat we would launch a scientific satellite dur-
ing the International Geophysical _)ar, which began- in July. 1957.1 Apparently, no one paid any
attention to the Soviets when they announced a few clays later that they also were going to launch a satel-
lite in conjunction with the IGY. 2 Evmyone assumed that the U.S. with its vastly superior technological
and industrial capabilities would be first. It came as quite a shock when they weren't.
Lyndon Johnson was on his ranch in Texas (the congress was in adjournment). Gerry Siegel of
his gilshington staff was there and they immediately discussed the possible impact of this new develop-
ment. That very night, Johnson was in communication with So/is Horwitz of his staff in Washington and
with Senator Richard B. Russell who was at his home In Winder, Georgia. (Senator Johnson, in addition
to being the Senate Majority Leader was Chairman of the Preparedness investigating Subcommittee of
the Senate Armed Services Committee chaired by Senator Russell). Although Senator Stuart Symington
had demanded an immediate full committee investigation, Senators Russell and Johnson had already
decided to handle the matter through the subcommittee. By Monday, October 7, 1957. Soils Ho_'itz had
already communicated with Defense Department officials 3 and on Oct. 8 had requested a complete report
and arranged for- staff briefings which began on Oct. 9. 4 So it is clear" that. despite some accounts that
"Johnson was slow to respond'"-' the exact opposite was true.
Ira the meantime, Sputnik was on the front pages in large type almost daily. People were confused
and afraid. The announced throw-weight and pinpoint accuracy at putting the satellite in a precise orbit,
had profound security implications (because these were also the requirements for long range ballistic
missiles). At 184 pounds it was almost nine times heavier than our announced Vanguard. In fact, one
British source suggested that in the translation a decimal point had been misplaced and the weight was
only 18.4 pounds. 6 There were comments from everywhere and from evelTbody but some of the most
interesting ones were coming from officials of the Eisenhower adminislration. In an effort to calm things
down, there was a clear' attempt do downplay the Soviet accomplishment. James C. Hagerty, White House
Press Secretm y said "We never thought of our program as one which was a race with the Soviets... the
satellite launching (lid not come as any surprise to the U.S."7: Sherman Adams. Assistant to the President
(today we would call him White House Chief of Staff), said we didn't intend to get into a "game of outer
space basketball... "'s with the Russians. outgoing Defense Secretary Charles E. Wilson called the
Sputnik '" neat scientific trick"9: and Clarence B. Randall, Presidential Advisor on Foreign Economic
Policy called Sputnik "...a silly bauble"and that he was "personally yen, gratified that our nation was
not first. "" in getting one up. t0
6. This paper was prepared fi}rthe symposium "'The Legislative Origins of the U. S. Space Program" j,_intly sp,ms,_red by
the Space Policy Institute ,ff the George _'ashingt.n University and the Lyn&m Baines J_,hns{m Library in Austin. Texas. The
symp,_sium wa:. held on the George _ashingtlm University campus in Washingtlm. D.C.. on April 3. 1992. The paper was sub-
sequently published as "'Lyndon Johnson and (he Legislative Origins ,_f NASA." Prologtte: Quarterly of the National
Archi¢:es 25 (Winter 1993): .362-72.
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EvenPresidentEisenhowerhimselfsaidthat the Sputnik didn't bother him "one iota. ''11 But
some of the members of the President's own party were more than just passingly concerned and Senators
Styles Bridges and l.everett Saltonstall, both also on the Preparedness Subcommittee. had joined in with
Johnson and Russell to press the Pentagon for explanations on w[_at was really going on with Sputnik and
where the U.S. really stood. There was a feeling that it might b_- necessary to hold hearings in spite of
the fact that congress was not in session.
George Reedy [Assistant, Press Secretary (and general taetotum as most of us were) to Lyndon
Johnson] wrote an extremely perspicacious memo to the Senator _n Oct. 17. in which he pointed out the
potential political payoff to Johnson, but most importantly, strongly recommended that the "...immediate
need is for gathering the facts and presenting them to the public--without hysteria, without elaboration
and definitely without partisanship" and, as it developed, looking for solutions for what needed to be done
to help solve the problem, rather than looking for scapegoats. 12 G¢rry Siegel also notified Johnson that the
Pentagon was ready to brief him. Senators Russell and Bridges, u hich happened the following week) 3
After the briefing, another bombshell hit on November 3rd. The Soviets launched Sputnik 2. Not
only did it contain a living creature, a dog named Liaka, but it v:eighed 1,120 pounds! That buried the
skepticism about the 18 pound weight of Sputnik 1. Concerns .about throw-weight and guidance were
intensified. And that settled the matter" about when to hold hearings. After another briefing at the
Pentagon cm November 4th. Johnson announced, with the concurrence of Senators Russell and Bridges.
that the Preparedness Subcommittee would begin hearings later that month, t4 He also selected Edwin L.
Weisl. a prominent New 'tbrk attorney and long time friend, to be the Chief Special Counsel. Mr. Weisl
brought with him a ,ising young star from his law firm, Cyrus Var, ce. and his son. Ed gv>isl Jr.
_)n November 7th. 1 was transferred to the Preparedness Subcommittee to help in the upcoming
inquil 7. in addition to regular Preparedness staffers Dan McGilli,:uddy, Stuart French, and Ben Gilleas.
others were l_v'_ught in from other Johnson staffs as I had been: f¢olis Horwitz, Gerry Siegel. and Harry
McPhe,son. and Dr. Edward C. _X'>lsh assistant to Senator Symington. Also brought on from the outside
as consultants were Dr. William Houston. President of Rice Institute (now University), Dr. Homer" Joe
Stuart from Cal. Teeh.. Washington attorney George Bunn. and. most importantly. Eilene Galloway from
the l.egislative Refe,enee Service of the Library of Congress.
In spite of the effo,ts of many administration officials tc downgrade the Sputnik problem, the
Eisenhower administration was seriously concerned and was working behind the scenes to come up with
some solutions. In a nationwide television speech on Nov. 7th, President Eisenhower tried to calm the
American people, showing them the nose cone that had been sh_,t back from outer space by the Army
booster (thr,s proving the advancement of American technology), stressed the need to give high priority
to scientific education, and announced the creation of the office in the White House of Special Assistant
fl_r S¢:ience and Te_'hnology and his intention to appoint Dr. James Killian to this position. 15 This was
widely interpreted as an intent by Eisenhower to put a decide¢ly scientific or "'civilian" cast to the
upcoming debate over control of outer space exploration. On November 8, the Pentagon announced that,
as a back up plan to Vanguard. Wernher von Braun and his tez m at Huntsville. Alabama. would be
allt_wed tt_ go forward with their plan to launch a satellite using their Jupiter-C booster, t6
There was a serious concern about the American education1 system. Was the Soviet system supe-
rior? They were turning out more scientists and engineer's thai we were. Was the,'e something we could
do with our educational system that could help us to recover fronl this setback? I was assigned to look
int_ this problem and wrote several memorandums and letters to leading educat_)rs on this subject. The
status of ot, r educational system became a major sub-issue in the ,.'nsuing hearings and conside,ation of
what we had to do t_ _vereome the Soviet advantage. 17
()n Monday. November 25. 1957, the Hearings of the Prep u'edness Subcommittee began. Public
interest wax intense. Johnson grabbed the headlines and TV coven,ge, as he had planned. But it also put
him up-frov_t in the public eye as being "Mr. Space," an Image he held for many years as the one politi-
cian who was m,ly interested in the space program and its implications for the future of the United States
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anditsplacein thefuturedevelopmentof mankind.Hislowkey"let'snotlookfor scapegoatsbutlet',,;
findoutwhat'swrongandlet'sdowhal'snecessaU to tix it" approach worked ve U much as George Reedy
hat] recommended. These comprehensive hearings heard 73 witnesses and were printed in three volumes
totaling 2,376 pages. There was general agreement: that we could have done better if we had given the
satellite project a higher priority: that satellites have milita U as well as scientific and other beneficial
uses; that better organization was necessary: and that we needed to pay greater attention to our techno-
logical and scientific: education. Jg
There was no consensus (because it was not the primary focus of the hearings) on how the United
States should be organized for space activities, although many scientists were strongly urging that a civil-
tan controlled "'Space Establishment" be established. Witnesses such as Nelson Rockefeller, for" exam-
ple, while testifying that the Secretary of Defense should decide where space research should be done.
opted to "pass,'" on the question of whether or not there should be an independent civilian agency. 19 The
televised failure of the first Vanguard launch attempt on December 6 only reinforced the fact that the
United States had a lot of catching up to do. At tile end of 1957 it remained an open question of where.
in the Federal Government, the responsibility for space development was going to be plac'ed.
During his testimony before the Preparedness Subcommittee on November 27, 1957. Secretary
of Defense Nell H. McElroy was questioned about a statement he had made on November 15 announc-
ing his J_)tention to create a position for a manager of antimissile and military space-project develop-
ments. 2° This quickly evolved into an addition to the Supplemental Military Construction At, thorization
Act (HR 9739), creating, within the Department of Defense, the Advanced Research Projects Agency
(this was to become PL-325). ARPA was designed to direct long-range antimissile missile and milita,?'
satellite programs in such a manner as to not detract from other high priority missile programs. After
some confusion in both the Senate and the House as to the best way to do this legally, it was finally agreed
not to create AI_.PA by haw but to authorize the Secretary of Defense to engage in such "advanced pro-
jeers" after consuhation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In conference on the Supplemental Military
Construction Authorization Act the following language was adopted: ",..and for a period of one year from
the effective date of this Act, the Secretary or Defense or his designee is further authorized to engage in
such advanced space projects as may be designated by the President". The conference report
explained..."This added temporary authorization is included in order to insure that such projects as the
Vanguard may continue unintmTupted for the time being. ''21
On Janum T 7, 1958, the second session of the Eighty-Fifth Congress convened. Space was on
evelybody's mind. There were several bills introduced in the Senate that would have given jurisdiction
over space to various committees. On January 23, Senator Johnson presented, on the Senate flora; the
points that had been agreed to by the Subcommittee which included "Start work at once on the develop-
ment of a rocket motor with a million pound thrust," "'Accelerate and expand research and development
programs, provide funding on a long-term basis, and improve control anti administration within the
Department of Defense or through the establishment of an Independent agency," and "Put more effotqt in
the development of manned missiles [satellites]. ''22 This report, as were all or Johnson's committee',,;
reports was unanimous. This was a steadfast Johnson belief that in matters of national security, and he
considered space to be a matter of national security, there were no Democrats or tlepublicans, only patri-
ots. Not one single Johnson committee report ever contained a "minority view."
At the end of Jatmary, just before midnight on the 31st, the country heaved a collective sigh of
relief when the Army team, headed by \Vernher yon Braun, launched the first successful American satel-
lite, Explorer 1. However, at only 31 pounds, it was obvious that we still had a lot of catching up to do.
But the situation in the Senate seemed to be bordering on chaos, and on Februa U 5, Senator
Johnson imroduced Secrete Rest_lution 256 to eslabJJsh a Special Committee o_) Space and Astronautics
to flame legislation for a national program of space exploration and development, and to re-refer all bills
regarding space to the special committee, h passed without dissent tile next day, showing, once again.
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the mastery thai lyndon Johnsun had mer the situation. 23 ()n Febmaly 20. to no one's surprise, I.BJ was
elected Chairrnan of this new special eomnliltee.
()n the House tloor, in passing the Supplemental l)e['e!lse Appr.priation Act for 1958 {which
¢'l,ntained money fi,r ARPA). Cmlgressman George Mahon. on February B made the following remarks:
Mr. Speaken to g_ further with reference to this prot)leln _d the conquest of space 1 should say it
apt)ears that there is ('onsiderable eonfusi,m in the (_,ove 'nment as to just who is going lo handle
our growing and urgenl programs for the c¢mquest of s[)a('e. The supplemental budget estimate sub-
milled by lhe President on January 7. 1958. was based on Ihe l)epartnlent of Defense being respon-
sible for these programs, specitk:ally those progrmns having to do with defense. Now we find the
Presidenl is having a special st|lay made to determine "th,' type of slructure we may Ileed to set up
ill the tield of ¢)uter space--as to where it will be in the overall structure of the Government. ''21
(In lqidav, Fel)ruarv 7. 1958. Secretary MeEl,'oy announced the establishment of ARPA. 2:; ahhough the
signing of file Act which gave him this authorily did not aeluallv take place until Februat.'y 12 (PL-325).
In the Hot,se of l'{epresentatives there was equal coneert_ about how to handle this new element
of space, }:'tit they felt that they had been put somewhat on lhe spot by the Senate with the decision to put
l,yndon Johnson himself in charge of the Senate Committee. Feeling that it was necessal 7 to have an
equally prestigious member to c[lair its operations, there was _real pressure put on House Majority
l,eader John _,_. McCormack to take the position. While at tirst reluctant to lake on this additional respon-
sibility, he tinally relented and the Select Commiltee on Astronautics and Space Exploration was creat-
ed I)v tile House. with Mr. McCormack as chai,man, on Maret_ 5, 1950. 26 Mr. McCormack selected
another prominent New Ym'k attorney and long time friend George J. Feldman to be staff director of the
new eonmlittee, i,ater, olher staff selected were S[letlcer Beresford, ]{ichar'd P. Hines. i'{aymond Wilcove,
Harnev S. B.gan. Jr.. Philip B. 'leager. Dr. Charles S. Sheldon, II from the l,egislative Reference Service
of the LiI)rarv of Congress. and l)r. S. Fred Singen scientific consultant.
Also on March 5. after two failures, l'_mguard 1 was successfully placed into orbit but. with a
diameter of 6.,1. inches and weighing only 3.25 |)ounds. it was clearly no match for tile Russian aceom-
p[ishnwnls. This was the satellite that Khrushehev derisively reierred to as the "grapefruit."
(In March 24, l _as transferre(] to the new staff as was F ilene (;alloway. ahhough we had both
been working on tile "'space `+pr.I)lenl sin('e Noveml)er. As t:'e|'ore, other people were borrowed hom other
of Senator Johns.n+s oftiees and frtml (:'tiler Senators' staffs. (_,erry Siegel was the defilCtO staff director.
and Ed \_,e'isl and Cy \anee came dOWll to help at the time of tile hearings.
Meanwhile. discussions continued within the White H_Juse with President Eisenhower. Vice
President Nixon. l)r. Kill|an, arrd Repul:'liean congressional leade,'s all being involved. 2"; Again no consen-
sus emerged in Fel)ruarv and, ira spite of tile passage of PL 325. and the continuing agreemenl for the high
pri,_rity of militarw needs, there still seemed indecision as to the bes: way to handle non-milital 7 projects.
By \_ednesday. March 5. the Htmse had created its Select Committee, the situation in the White
House had begun to crystallize. Ill a memorandum to the President on that date, the President's Advisory
Cmumittee on Gm:evnment ()rganization (:haired by Nelson [:I,ck, d'eller and also signed by l)r. Kill|an
and Budget Bureau Director. Percival FIrundage. recommended that long term organization for space
exploratim_ be under civilian control and that "'...leadership of die civil space effm't be lodged ill a
strengthened and redesignated National Advisory committee for Aeronautics (NACA). "'2_
The President avcepted this recommendation, and directed the Budget Bureau to proceed imme-
diately with the preparation of specitic proposals for legislative and e _ecutive action. This was done and the
President sent a message t_:'the Congress on April 2 proposing the e_ta[)lishnlenl of a National Aeronautics
and Space Agency into which the NatiCmal Advismy Colnnliltee ['t)r \eronautics wouhl be absorbed.
The new agency was to have responsibility for civilian space science and aeronautical research.
it would conduct research in these fields In its OWll facilities or by contract and would also perform mil-
itary research required by the military departments. Inter|n1 projects pertaining to lhe civilian program
which were under the direction of ARPA u,uhl be hansferred to the civilian space agerlcy. 2_'_ A 17 mere-
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berNationalAeronautics and Space Board would be appointed by the President to assist him and the
director of the new agency. On April 14, the bill was introduced by Senators Johnson and Bridges in the
Senate (S.3609) and by Congressman McCo,'mack (HR 11881) and others in the House.
The House committee sprang into action on April 15 hearing 48 witnesses over 17 days ending
on May 12. producing a volume of 1.542 pages, and, of necessity, re-covering much of the ground previ-
ously covered by the Preparedness subcommittee in November through January. 3°
The Senate committee, sticking mainly to consideration of the language in the proposed bill
Itself. conducted 6 clays of hearings. May 0--8 and 13-15, hearing 20 witnesses, and producing two vol-
umes totaIing 413 pages. :_ Additional urgency wash added to the proceedings when it was announced,
on Thu,sday May 15. the last (lay of the-hearings, that the Soviets had successfully launched Sputnik 3
with an estimated 7,000 pounds in orbit.
The House committee, working feverishly, introduced a clean bill on May 20 which was report-
ed out on May 24. Numerous modifications were made from the original proposal, including broadening
and clarifying the scope of the space agency, changing its name to Administration instead of Agency, and
giving greater authority to the Administrator (instead of Director). It also established statutory liaison
committees with the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission and provided for greater
dissemination of information and greater" international cooperation. It also had a section on patents
and created a ne_' Joint Committee on Aeronautics and Space. The bill passed the House on June 2.
however, on the House floor; the joint committee was deleted from the bill. 32
The Senate committee in its deliberations, of course, had the House committee's report before
them. The staff had prepared a draft of the bill. with some modifications, for the committee to consider
based on the bill reported out by the House committee. Much of the House language was in this Senate
draft including the sections on patents and the joint committee. At the mark-up some Senators raised the
question of why the joint committee was still in the bill when the House had already deleted this provi-
sion. Senator Johnson said he wanted to leave it ira so that he would have something to bargain with when
it came lime for the conference committee.
On June 11 the Senate committee reported the bill out and on June 16 the bill was passed. The
Senate version broadened and clarified the scope of the agency, established a powerful Space Policy
Board with a staff, authorized a program of international cooperation, and retained the Joint Committee
on Aeronautics and Space. Only the patent section was dropped from the bill on the Senate floor. 33
The White House was opposed to the strong Space Policy Board on the grounds that it would
usurp the authority of the President anti the House agreed with the Administration. The impasse was bro-
ken. however, on July 7 when Senator" Johnson and President Eisenhower met at the White House.
Johnson proposed that the President himself should be the chairman of the policy board and this was
agreed to by Eisenhower. 34
The House anti Senate conferees met on July 15, agreed to the policy board but changed its name
to the National Aeronautics and Space Council. rewrote the section on patents, and, of course, dropped
the provision for a joint committee. On the same day. Senators Johnson and Bridges introduced a reso-
lution to create a standing committee, the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, to have juris-
diction over the new agency.
The conference report was passed by both houses on July 16 and, although there was some con-
tern about the international cooperation provision, was signed into law as Public Law 85-568 by the
President on July 29. 1958.
The act contained a declaration of policy and purpose: definitions: established the National
Aeronautics and Space Council with staff as an advisory group to the President on matters of overall
sp_we polic_. _.development of a comprehensive program, allocation of responsibility: and settling of dif-
ferences: provided for an Administrator and Deputy Administrator: defined the functions of the new
agency: established a military-civilian liaison committee: authorized international cooperation: and
required reports to the Congress. It also provided for the transfer of NACA and related functions: public
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access to information: security: patent and property rights and contributions awards; and an authoriza-
tion for appropriations. To resolve the concern over the international cooperation section, upon signing
the act,/he President stated, in part:
The new act contains one provision that requires comment. Section 205 aulhorizes cooperation
with other nations and groups of nations in work done f)ursuanl to the act and in the peaceful
application of the resuhs of such work, pursuant to inte'na/iona[ agreements entered into by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate. I regard this section merely as recognizing
that international treaties may be made in this field, and as not prechtding, in appropriate cases.
less formal arrangements for cooperation. To construe the section otherwise would raise sub-
stantial constitutional questions. 36
On July 21 the House had passed the resolution to create a 25-member standing Conlmiltee on
Science and Astronautics, and on July 23 the Senate had passed the resolution to create a 15-member
standing Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences.
In consideration of a supplemental appropriations bill in August, Senator Johnson inserted a pro-
vision to require prior authorization for all of NASA's appropriations which was, actually, the first major
amendment to the NASA act. This was at first bitterly opposed by officials at the NACA (NASA didn't offi-
cially come into existence until October 1) who failed to see how important this would be to them in obtain-
ing appropriations in the future. Through a misunderstanding, it was also opposed in the House. Howeven
a compromise was reached, 37 and the provision made permanent the following year. Because of this pro-
vision. NASA received much more money in the ensuing years than they probably would have othm_qse.
And in November. in a spirit of rapprochement, The White House asked l,yndon Johnson to
make a major speech on space before the United Nations. In his ;tddress to the United Nations, given on
November 17, 1958, Senator Johnson stressed the importance ot conducting space activities for peace-
ful purposes, emphasized the need for international cooperation, and urged the support of the pending
resolution to create an "'Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. ''38 This resolution was
adopted on December 13. 1958.
The entire legislative process, from Sputnik to the end of 1958. was almost a textbook case of
how law, spurred by technological advancement, should be made. There is a statement (on p. 141) in Dr.
James R. Killian's book Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower which sums it up well. except that I have
added in italics the words "'the Congress," to make it more accmate. 39
Many influences were brought to bear on the formulation _ f the [space] legislation, as they should
have been, and the final act represented a remarkable blending ot the Interests, needs, and objectives of
the administration, the Department of Defense. the Congress, and the scientific community. While the
President's science advisers had played a key role in opting for a civilian agency and in the shaping of
the administration's original legislative proposal. I think they would have readily agreed that their pro-
posals were but the start of a process of developing uhimate legislation that would fairly represent the
needs and views of all Interested parties.
Now, in 1992, we are still wrestling with some of the pro _lems of space exploration and devel-
opment and space organization that were identified during the birth of what is perhaps mankind's noblest
adventure. Lyndon Johnson said it best in his opening statement at the hearings before the Special
Committee on Space and Astronautics to consider the space bill (May 6, 1958). "Space affects all of us
and all that we do, ira out" private lives, in our business, in our e!lucation, and in our Government. We
shall succeed o1"fail in ]elation to our national success at incorpol,ding the exploration and utilization of
space into all aspects of our society and the enrichment of all pha_es .f our life on this earth. "'u_
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Appendix B
Additional Comments
by Eilene Galloway
l. LBJ's Initial Reaction to Sputnik.
Dr. I,{_gs&m noted some discrepancies in accounts by participants. The discrepancy caused l>y
George Reedy's qtJestiona}>h" :recount of Seminar Johnson's initial react|tin t, Ihe orb|ling {d Sputnik can
be cleared up by a |'actual citation of lhe Senator's actions immediately following the news on Friday.
October ,1. 19,57 that the Smiet Union was tirsl to launch a satellite into outer space.
LBJ was in "l_xas when the news broke and immediately he phoned the Chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee. Senator Richard B. Hussel]. They realized that Sputnik dem_mstrated the
capability of the Soviet Union for launching intereontinenlal ballistic missiles, instantly creating a prob-
lem for U.S. national defense. Senator Hussell arranged for Senator Johnson. who was chairman of the
Preparedness Investigating Subeomnfittee. to hold hearings on what I_ecame the 'qnquiry Into Satellite
and Missile lh'ograms" (which began November 25, 1957). Senat.r Russell told IJ+J thai I could assist
him with these hearings.
On Monday morning, October 7, Senator Russell phoned me and requested a report on "The
Impact on lhe United Slales of the Soviet Union Being First to Launch a Satellite." Senator Johnson
phoned me that m<)rning and asked fi)r my assistance, and ! l)egan on that (lay to coneetltrate on outer
space problems, l was contacted })ecause 1 was National Defense Analyst in the Congressional Research
Service and |or some time had been working [be the Senate Armed Services Committee and some of its
members, on organization of the Department of I)efense. mililary man-power legislation, an(I (luestions
for hearings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the spring of 1957, 1 had wrilten a report on "'Guided
Missiles in Foreign Countries "+ w/rich was published by the House and Senate. Sputnik exph)ded on
Capital Hill like a psychological bomb. arousing feats of orb|ling weapons and consternation that the
Soviet Uniml had taken the lead in rocketry. The general public reacled witl] alarm.
In this situation I,BJ reacted swiftly and became the most energized leader I have ever t+ehehl
in galvanizing the Congress. the Pentagon, industry and the scientific community, to take decisive action
to achieve U. S. preeminence in outer space.
How is it possible, therefin'e, to understand George I_.eedy's impressi,m that "'in the immediate
aftermath, for about two weeks. ! merely let the thing vegilale?" Thai he "sort of got the space thing ml
the back burner": that "'we [I.BJ and Reedy] were down ml the ranch pretty well isolated." and that I.BJ
"'may have started out not so much opposed to, but with a feeling lhat this was nonsense." h was not |mill
some clays later that Reedy was briefed by Charles S. Brewton on the signith'ance of Sputnik, and under-
stood the implications of the situation. Then he wrote a positive memorandum to LBJ on ()ctober 17.
By ()etober 17, I had been working fin Senators Russell and Johnson fi+r lO days. and so had the
Armed Services" stat] aml others in the Executive Bratwh.
.57
IJ:'_GISIATIVE()I/IGINS()FTHENATIONAl,AEI_J)NAtTICSANDSPACEACTOF1958
Myestimateofthesituationis that I,BJ's instinct was immediately In contact Senator Russell and
military experts on tile cotnmitlee silt'{" and in the Deparltnent ,f l)efense. He had participated in the
Committee's hearings on aspects of deJense, including analyses ,ff rockels. LBJ depended on Reedy for
a variety of subjects--it was a time when civil rights had a t)riority--and although listed on the
Preparedness Subcommittee staff, both Reedy and (.;er O' Siegel noted thai for some time that subcom-
mittee had been dethnct--not so the permanent staff, howeven Mv estimate is that George Reedy was not
immediately aware of Sputnik+,-; signil'icance and because I,l/J did not contact him. he assumed the
Senator was not aroused by this event. Reedy was describing hi_ own reactions and attributing them to
the Senatot: After Reedy returned to \Vlshington. he was brought into the picture anti hat] a briefing at
the Pentagon and commented "'that is where we first learned atmut Atlas and Polaris and all of those
things," indicating thal he first learned about some rockets.
I agree with Reedy that LBJ was not motivated by thoc|ghts of running for F'resident at that
lime--as he says. maybe earlier and later. I,BJ was understandably anxious about his prospects for con-
Iinuing health. I recall in San Antonio, he came to a [light of sleps and ordinarily he would take them two
at a time. but he looked slightly distressed and turned his steps to the elevator. However, I noticed that
there were persons surrounding him who buzzed a,ound because they were interested in his becoming
presidenl. But am' historian who interprets l.BJ's role in extending the U. S. into ouler space as motivat-
ed by the presidency is cynical and misplacing his own reaction to the situation.
2. Section 205 NASA X +tuthority,lbr international cooperation.
I think the most significant action I ever took in my professional career concerned section 205 of
the NASA Act on International Cooperation. Had the words added by Senator Green +'t)y and with the
advice and consent of the Senate" remained in the law without interpretation, NASNs program of interna-
tional cooperation would have been restricted to formal treaty-type programs. The Senate Committee','+ put'-
pose was to provide authority for international agreements in the broad range of projects essential for the
development of space science and technology in a naturally inter_ ational field. The U.S. has a variety of
methods for accomplishing such objectives: treaties, executive agreements, agency-to-agency agreements,
memoranda of understanding (M()Us) and letter agreements, h would have been counterproductive iv
restrict the means bv which the agreed goal could be reached. The scope of NASA's international program
was fortified by President Eisenhower's statement when he signed he bill that created NASA:
The new act contains one provisi(m thai re<luires commettt. Section 205 attthorizes cooperation
with other nati()ns and groui)s of nations in w()rk done pttrsuant t() the act attd in the peaceful
application of the resuhs of such wmk. pursuant to international agreements entered into by the
President with the ad++ice and consent of the Senate. I regard this section merely as recognizing
that internatiotml treaties may [>e made in this fiehl, and a.+ nt+t precluding, in apfm>priate cases,
less formal arrangements for cooperation. To c<mstrue the section otherwise would raise sub-
slantial c<mstituti_ma] questions.
Later [ prepared a Senate Document on "'United States hLternational Space F'rograms: +l>xts of
Executive Agreements. Memoranda of Unde,standing. and (hher International Arrangements,
1959-1965.'" (Senate document No. 44.89th Congress. 1st sessioa, Senate Committee on Aeronautical
and Space Sciences. July 31L 1965. 575 P.) The intruduction explains the different methods available for
international cooperation, and under this authuritv NASA has agleements appropriate to the prugram,
with over 100 countries.
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3. President Eisenhower and Senator Lyndon B. Johnson Cooperation on the Role of the
United Nations in Outer ,Space.
It seems to me that the historians and media have not paid sufficient attention to the dramatic
event of tile Republican President Eisenhower asking the Democratic leader of the U. S. Senate, Lyndon
Johnson, to fly to the United Nations and get support for Eisenhower's proposal to create the Ad hoc
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Eisenhower sent a plane to Texas and LBJ flew with
some staff to Laguardia in New _brk where he was met by our UN Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. LBJ
addressed the UN on November 17, 1958 to express "the essential unity of the American people in their
support of the goals of the resolution" proposed by President Eisenhower. The Committee was established
and within a year became a permanent Committee with two subcommittees, Legal, and Scientific and
Technical, growing from 24 to 61 members. This is the Committee that through the years has formulated
five treaties on outer space.
This is an historic event of the President and Senate leader cooperating on a major foreign pol-
icy goal in spite of the fact that they were members of different political parties. As LBJ stated, "These
are distinctions. They are not. on this resolution, differences."
4. National Aeronautics and Space Council: Main Difference between Eisenhower's Proposed
Legislation and the NASA Act as Passed by Congress.
There was agreement on three main concepts in the proposal President Eisenhower sent to the
Congress on April 2, 1958: to create a civilian space agency, to use the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics (NACA) as the nucleus to expand into NASA, and that the Department of Defense should
be responsible for space science and technology essential for its jurisdiction.
The difference that developed concerned the need for coordination in the Executive Branch. The
Senate was not satisfied with the declaration of policy in the draft legislation concerning the relations
between the new civilian agency and the Department of Defense. The draft proposed that NASA exercise
control over aeronautical and space research except for those "peculiar to or primarily associated with
weapons systems or military operating," and in such a case NASA "may act in cooperation with, or on
behalf of DOD. Senator Russell rewrote the policy so that the lines of responsibility between NASA and
DOD were clearer and gave the President responsibility for determining questions as to which such
agency had responsibility.
I wrote the memorandum for Senator Johnson on the necessity for coordination by the National
Aeronautics and Space Council, and the test is in the Final Report of the Senate Special Committee on
Space and Astronautics, Senate report No. 100, 86th Congress, 1st session, March 11, 1959, pp. 3-12. I
called it a board because they had been discussing the board of NACA, and this was changed from board
to council during the conference committee meeting. I asked NASA to send the Senate committee a chart
showing the areas of scientific cooperation between NASA and other Federal Activities, and this on page
11 of the Final Report. Although the agencies changed, nevertheless the concept remained that space
activities would be of concern to more agencies than NASA and DOD. I understand that later, Dr. Glennan,
administrator of NASA, wished to recall this chart but by that time I had already sent it to the printer.
5. Some Miscellaneous Points.
Lyndon Johnson asked me to write an analysis of how Congress should be organized to handled legisla-
tion on space activities as the subject cut across committee jurisdictions, I have an account of this in the
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paper I wrote on "The U.S. Congress and Outer Space: From Sputnik to the Shuttle" published in
"'Between Sputnik and the Shuttle: New Perspe_:tive on Ameri¢:an Astronautics" edited by Frederick C.
Durant, Ill. History series of the Ameri_'an Astr.nautical Sobriety, V,I. 3. San Diego, California 1981 pp,
139-157. Illustrated.
This is important in indicating the spread of space science and technology in enabling agencies to
improve functions they were already performing: and iH illustrating the necessity for matching organiza-
tions in the Executive Branch with those in the Congress. both for authorizing and appropriating funds.
I got the word "unnecessary'" in the NASA Act Sec. 102 (C) (8) at a staff meeting with Senator
Symington. Usually persons come to the Hill and prove their projects is marvelous because it prevents over-
lapping and duplication, so 1 had at litst a hard time getting "'unnecessary" before "duplication," but they
finally agreed that DOD would need some activities that were similar to the civilian and should be allowed.
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Pub. Law 85-568 .2- 3uly 29, 1958
(7) Cx_ol._eratioa by th_ I.._aite4 ,States with ca.her n_li,ms at_d
grmq_., of aatioas in work :(lo)te p_iz._aant to. this A¢( arid in th_
_eefa! al_pli_tion, of the _t_ thereof; a_d
(8) Tt_ most effective u_iliz_tien of the _.iei_tifi,.'. and engin_-
h_g r_mroes of :the I_'n_ted States,: w_tJa z]_ eoope.r_ttion _
all interested agencies of :the _United: Slates i_ order to a_oi_
_m_ry duplieat.io:_ of ,fto_rt, f_d.titie_ m,d txl_ti_._>m_,_t.
(d) It is the purpt_ of thi_ :A_ re: earry otit and e:ttee(uaO_
l_31ie._esdoelaredht s_b_iar_.,* (a):) (b_,aud (e}.
S_c. lOlL ._s used ba this ._k_--
(1) the term aero_a_tt_¢_l and :spaee act,tv_t:t_ mean. (A)
rmem'eh iata, and the _:,h_tion of, pI;_bleu_ of ttight ,,ithin aria
ou_ide th_ earfh's :_traosph.eee, (B) tlae dev_iopfiie_t., co)_stnw-
tion_, testing, and operat!io,n for reseaicA pnrp_s ot acronau_i_
and spm_ vehie:le/_ ar_d (C) sudt other at._.iviti_ a_ may be
r_ui_d tor the e_plo_('.ion :ofst_ee; _md
(_) the ten)t %_ron_utk_t, _, Spa_e vehlzl_" n_lea_ _ir-
ttnmamie/t, t_tt_.er: with related eqtfil_mettt, device. ¢om_eett_
and parts. ...... ....
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